Showing posts with label Mexico. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mexico. Show all posts

November 26, 2020

Abstract: Environmental Violence and the Socio-environmental (de)Evolution of a Landscape in the San Quintín Valley

 

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Environmental Violence and the Socio-environmental (de)Evolution of a Landscape in the San Quintín Valley
 

by  Nemer E. Narchi, Sula E. Vanderplank, Jesús Medina-Rodríguez, Enrique Alfaro-Mercado

"The social and environmental effects of industrial agriculture in the San Quintín Valley of Baja California are closely related. An environmental history of the valley from European contact to the present demonstrates that modern schemes of globalized agricultural production erode biological diversity while fostering labor exploitation. A critical model drawing on the concept of environmental violence— historically structured asymmetrical power relations that are reproduced and maintained to foster capital accumulation—describes how neoliberalism shapes and exploits agro-industrial landscapes and livelihoods in San Quintín to produce a crisis of underproduction.


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November 24, 2020

Abstract: Forced Disappearance as a Collective Cultural Trauma in the Ayotzinapa Movement

 

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Forced Disappearance as a Collective Cultural Trauma in the Ayotzinapa Movement
 

by  Tommaso Gravante


The disappearance of 43 students of the teachers’ training college at Ayotzinapa in 2014 has inspired a broad social movement. Ethnographic work and interviews conducted at several of the demonstrations to show solidarity with the parents of the students reveal that their forced disappearance has been framed by participants as a collective cultural trauma. The politicization of this trauma has led to a change in the relationship between citizens and public    institutions and produced a new social narrative.


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November 19, 2020

Abstract: Enrique Mendieta and the Ghosts of Leftism Past: The Aftereffects of Mexico’s Dirty War in Élmer Mendoza’s Detective Fiction

 

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Enrique Mendieta and the Ghosts of Leftism Past: The Aftereffects of Mexico’s Dirty War in Élmer Mendoza’s Detective Fiction
 

by  Michael K. Walonen


The continuance of the revolutionary strife of Mexico’s dirty war into the present day, both as a legacy and in the form of its survivors, resonates strongly in the work of the novelist Élmer Mendoza. Mendoza’s early novel Janis Joplin’s Lover uses its protagonist to portray a 1970s Mexico torn between a revolutionary path of collective social amelioration and the corrupt, mercenary self-interest embodied by Mexican narco-traffickers, with the country pushed toward the latter through the repression of student activists by the Mexican state. Mendoza’s five subsequent novels that center on the exploits of detective Lefty Mendieta focus on the fallout from this period of repression, using the figure of Lefty’s brother Enrique, a former leftist guerrilla, to represent a lost (but not totally lost) egalitarian and socially just alternative to the neoliberal political economy that has ravaged the living conditions of most Mexicans for almost four decades.


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November 17, 2020

Abstract: Fast-track Redevelopment and Slow-track Regularization: The Uneven Geographies of Spatial Regulation in Mexico City

 

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Fast-track Redevelopment and Slow-track Regularization: The Uneven Geographies of Spatial Regulation in Mexico City
 

by  Jill Wigle


Some of the increasingly evident contradictions between spatial planning and social policy in Mexico City are apparent in the way land use regulation folds into and articulates with exclusion and marginality. In downtown areas, regulatory approvals and various planning measures have facilitated the escalation of land and housing prices and more exclusionary forms of urban development. At the periphery, land use regulation now conditions access to urban services, property titles, and even some social programs for settlement areas designated as “informal.” Comparing the state’s role in planning at these distinct sites uncovers a pattern of selective and uneven spatial regulation in different socioeconomic territories of the city, characterized by “fast-track” development approvals in downtown areas and “slow-track” regularization of settlements in peripheral areas. The analysis suggests how this pattern of uneven spatial regulation contributes to (re)producing urban space in ways that call into question the local government’s stated support for the “right to the city.”


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November 12, 2020

Abstract: Female Bodies and Globalization: The Work of Indigenous Women Weavers in Zinacantán

 

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Female Bodies and Globalization: The Work of Indigenous Women Weavers in Zinacantán
 

by  Eugenia Bayona Escat


Women producers and sellers of textile crafts in Zinacantán, Chiapas, Mexico, use one of the few resources they have to enter business: craft production as informal, invisible, and underpaid work. Taking the body as the axis of analysis, three distinct areas of transformation of indigenous women producers by tourism may be identified: the private and domestic body of craftswomen, the social and public body as an icon of ethnic difference, and the commodified body as an extension of the touristic object. The analysis shows that tourism and participation in the international market strengthen gender, class, and ethnic differences and contribute to the perpetuation of existing inequalities.


November 10, 2020

 

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Climate Change, Neoliberalism, and Migration: Mexican Sons of Peasants on the Beach
 

by  Tamar Diana Wilson

Climate change and neoliberal policies in Mexico have been fomenting migration by campesinos and their sons. This migration is primarily internal, to cities and tourist centers, where migrants engage in informal and semi-informal income-generating activities. Interviews with 32 beach vendors, sons of campesinos, in Cabo San Lucas reflect these two drivers of migration: while most reported that they would like to farm, they identified drought and lack of government aid as major difficulties for farmers in their hometowns.



October 5, 2020

The Shadow Pandemic

 By Amy Risley


In June 2020, the World Health Organization identified Latin America as an epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic. Sadly, the region now risks becoming an epicenter of the “Shadow Pandemic,” the global surge in gender-based violence (UN Women 2020a). In Latin America, an estimated 20 million women and girls experience sexual and physical abuse each year. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, at least 3,529 women were victims of femicide in 2018 (Fumega 2020). Available data suggest a substantial increase in physical and sexual intimate partner violence across the region during the pandemic. 


Notwithstanding this spike, the structural, institutional, and cultural forces that create a permissive environment for such violence predate the arrival of coronavirus. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Central America and Mexico, where women activists and human rights defenders are insisting that the “crisis was already here” when the pandemic hit (IM-Defensoras 2020). Communities were already reeling from simultaneous social and political crises, militarized policing, and state-sponsored repression and criminal violence targeting activists who defend the environment and the rights of women, LGBTQ, indigenous, Afro-indigenous, and other communities. Neoliberal economic policies had exacerbated inequalities and undermined public health systems. This state of affairs underscores the need for feminist, intersectional research that examines how gender, class, ethnicity, race, and sexuality have shaped individuals’ experiences during the pandemic. 

Feminist researchers often search out seemingly “private” spaces, including the home, because they recognize that power is created and wielded, and legitimized there. Seven out of ten femicides in Argentina are committed in the victim’s home; the number is a tragic reminder that home can hardly be considered as a “refuge” for women (Fumega 2020). Confinement at home can be a necessary, life-saving measure during the pandemic, yet it also exacerbates the risk factors associated with gender-based violence. Not only are survivors in close quarters with their abusers; they are potentially cut off from crucial forms of support. These can include services provided by state agencies and non-governmental organizations as well as informal support networks comprising friends and family (UN Women 2020b). Offices close, and resources are diverted from support services to immediate COVID-19 relief (UN Women 2020a). 

In addition, confinement is creating economic pressures and exacerbating underlying risk factors associated with gender-based violence, such as unemployment, underemployment, and poverty. Pandemics may fuel harassment of and violence against female healthcare workers, migrant laborers, and domestic workers and heighten the risk of xenophobic violence. Women and girls with disabilities are sometimes subjected to sexual violence at greater rates. Individuals experience multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination that make them especially vulnerable (UN Women 2020b). Consider, moreover, the gendered roles of the “dutiful” wife, mother, and/or daughter and the added responsibilities that caregivers assume within their families and community during a pandemic. As the executive director of the United Nations Population Fund observes, the crisis “is compounding the no longer subterranean disparities that affect millions of women and girls” (Ford 2020).

Latin America is not immune from these global trends. Peru’s Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations reported higher numbers of gender violence cases following the implementation of quarantine (LAND 2020a). In July, the Ministry informed the public that 2,457 women had gone missing in the country during the lockdown; included in that figure were 1,720 minors. The authorities hastily added that many had already returned home, and they were working with some 400 local women’s emergency centers to locate the others (LAND 2020b). In Brazil’s state of São Paulo, cases of violence against women in which police were dispatched jumped 45 percent in March compared to the previous year (Sigal et al. 2020). In El Salvador, reports of violence against women rose 70 percent between March 17 and May 22 relative to 2019 (IM-Defensoras 2020). In Colombia, the government reported a 130 percent surge in call volume to a national women’s helpline for domestic violence in the first 18 days of quarantine (Sigal et al. 2020). Similarly, in Argentina, calls to domestic violence helplines grew 40 percent after the government implemented quarantine (Fumega 2020). The Chilean government likewise observed that calls to domestic abuse helplines increased 70 percent in the first weekend of quarantine alone (Sigal et al. 2020). 

The region has experienced unbearable increases in numbers of female murder victims. According to the Mexican government, murders of women committed in the first six months of 2020 rose 9.2 percent vis-à-vis the first half of 2019 (Associated Press 2020). As of April 13, “more women had been murdered (367) than had died due to COVID-19 (100) since the country’s first confirmed coronavirus case on February 28” (Prusa, García Nice and Soledad 2020). In Venezuela, femicides increased by 65 percent in April 2020 compared to April 2019 (International Rescue Committee 2020). Similarly, femicides in six Brazilian states increased 56 percent in March relative to the same period the previous year; in Argentina, 49 femicides were committed between March 20 and May 10 (Prusa, García Nice, and Soledad 2020). A shocking 83 femicides were documented in Honduras (IM-Defensoras 2020). 

Women in Mexico and Central America have assisted survivors of gender violence, organized feminist mutual care networks at the grassroots, mobilized relief efforts to deliver food, supplies, and health care to communities, denounced human rights violations, and participated in protests (IM-Defensoras 2020). The authorities have detained politically active women for violating quarantine, prompting concerns that such measures are being used as a pretext to stifle activism. In El Salvador, for example, police detained a member of the Network of Mesoamerican Women in Resistance while she was on her way to buy medicine for her three-year-old, hospitalized son. She was held for more than 30 days in unsanitary conditions; she was not provided a mask, hand sanitizer, or medicine for her diabetes (IM-Defensoras 2020). 

In conclusion, Latin Americans were already enduring multiple and intersecting forms of gender-based violence when the coronavirus arrived. The violence has intensified since the outbreak. Is there a way out of the shadow pandemic? Most of the region’s governments have already enacted legal, policing, and relief measures designed to assist survivors of gender-based violence during COVID-19. Legal reforms have eased the prosecution of offenders (LAND 2020a). Although stepped-up responses are certainly necessary, feminist public health models extend well beyond individual-level, criminal justice interventions and short-term relief. Feminists also tackle the root causes of violence. We interrogate neoliberalism and the political economy of women’s (re)domestication and relegation to the private sphere. We continually reckon with the crushing inequalities that are literally matters of life or death, even in the absence of a pandemic. Feminist analyses, moreover, challenge militarization and authoritarianism while drawing connections between domestic and state-sponsored forms of violence. It was Chilean feminists who famously demanded “democracy in the home and in the country” in the final years of the country’s military dictatorship. Their words still resonate today. 

Amy E. Risley is a Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College



References:

Associated Press. 2020. “In Mexico, women's murders have spiked during coronavirus pandemic.” (July 21). Accessed July 2020.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/mexico-women-s-murders-have-spiked-during-coronavirus-pandemic-n1234451

Ford, Liz. 2020. “'Calamitous': domestic violence set to soar by 20% during global lockdown.” The Guardian, April 28. Accessed July 2020.
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/apr/28/calamitous-domestic-violence-set-to-soar-by-20-during-global-lockdown-coronavirus

Fumega, Silvana. 2020. “Tracking Latin America’s Other Pandemic: Violence Against Women.” Americas Quarterly, April 13. Accessed July 2020.
https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/tracking-latin-americas-other-pandemic-violence-against-women/

IM-Defensoras (Iniciativa Mesoamericana de Mujeres Defensoras de Derechos Humanos). 2020. “La Crisis Ya Estaba Aquí.: Defensoras mesoamericanas ante COVID-19.” Accessed July 2020.
http://im-defensoras.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/La-crisis-ya-estaba-aqu%C3%AD-10062020.pdf

International Rescue Committee. 2020. “IRC data shows an increase in reports of gender-based violence across Latin America.” (June 9). Accessed July 2020.
 https://www.rescue.org/press-release/irc-data-shows-increase-reports-gender-based-violence-across-latin-america

LAND (Latin America News Dispatch). 2020a. Today in Latin America, April 30. Accessed July 2020. https://latindispatch.com/

LAND. 2020b. Today in Latin America, July 16. Accessed July 2020. https://latindispatch.com/

Prusa, Anya, Beatriz García Nice and Olivia Soledad. 2020. “Pandemic of Violence: Protecting Women during COVID-19.” Wilson Center, May 15. Accessed July 2020. 
dhttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/pandemic-violence-protecting-women-during-covid-19

Sigal, Lucila et al. 2020. “Another pandemic': In Latin America, domestic abuse rises amid lockdown.” Reuters, April 27. Accessed July 2020.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-latam-domesticviol/another-pandemic-in-latin-america-domestic-abuse-rises-amid-lockdown-idUSKCN2291JS

UN Women. 2020a. “The Shadow Pandemic: Violence against women during COVID-19.” Accessed July 2020.
https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/in-focus-gender-equality-in-covid-19-response/violence-against-women-during-covid-19

UN Women. 2020b. “Violence against women and girls: Data collection during COVID-19” (April 17). Accessed July 2020. https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/vawg-data-collection-during-covid-19-compressed.pdf?la=en&vs=2339

 

June 26, 2020

Abstract, Transnational Organizations, Accessibility, and the Next Generation

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Transnational Organizations, Accessibility, and the Next Generation

by Jack Durrell 

Involvement in transnational organizations is an understudied aspect of next-generation transnationalism, the cross-border connections maintained by individuals born and/or raised in countries of settlement. Exploration of institutional accessibility—the existence or nonexistence of barriers to next-generation inclusion—across a nonrepresentative sample of Mexican and Salvadoran transnational political and philanthropic groups operating in California and Washington, DC, shows how it can facilitate next-generation involvement in cross-border organizations. Accessibility is judged in terms of four main indicators: resource constraints, outreach strategies, involvement in U.S. political arenas, and pervasive institutional cultures.




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La participación en organizaciones transnacionales es un aspecto poco estudiado del transnacionalismo de la próxima generación, las conexiones transfronterizas mantenidas por individuos nacidos y / o criados en países de asentamiento. La exploración de la accesibilidad institucional—la existencia o inexistencia de barreras para la inclusión de la próxima generación—a través de una muestra no representativa de grupos políticos y filantrópicos transnacionales mexicanos y salvadoreños que operan en California y Washington, DC, muestra cómo puede facilitar la participación de la próxima generación en organizaciones transfronterizas. La accesibilidad se juzga en términos de cuatro indicadores principales: limitaciones de recursos, estrategias de publicidad y reclutamiento, participación en los ámbitos políticos de los EE. UU. y culturas institucionales generalizadas.




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May 18, 2020

Austeridad Republicana and Contradictions in Mexico’s Response to COVID-19

By Andrew R. Smolski, Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at North Carolina State University and member of the Latin American Perspectives editorial collective
 

On May 3rd, 2020, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) published “Algunas lecciones de la pandemia COVID-19”. In this brief document, the President of Mexico makes clear that neoliberal policies, such as privatization and austerity for public universities, have led to a crisis in public health exacerbated by the pandemic. AMLO has consistently pointed to four decades of neoliberalization as creating many of the ills Mexico confronts, from a majority of the population employed in the informal sector to almost a majority of the country living in poverty. And he is not wrong. 

For instance, in public health neoliberalization has had a major negative impact. Since the late 1990s, Mexican public health institutions, like the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), have seen market reforms that reduced the amount and quality of care. This is the case, even while healthcare expenditures increased in Mexico since 2000. So, you have reductions in care with increasing costs and poorer outcomes. In 2006, a year before the drug war began in earnest, life expectancy stalled, a trend continuing to the present. That ended more than four decades of increasing life expectancy.

AMLO’s administration has sought to reverse that trend through a reinvigoration of the universal right to healthcare, itself enshrined in Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution.  The major policy has been the Instituto de Salud para el Bienestar (Insabi), which is meant to augment public health by covering people not covered by IMSS or the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE). Through an increase in public provisioning of medical services and pharmaceuticals and a rollback of market reforms, Insabi could reverse the neoliberalization of public health and return Mexico to a positive trend for life expectancy. 

“Algunas lecciones de la pandemia COVID-19” also develops an alter-modernist vision, one that is strikingly reminiscent of liberation scholars. AMLO writes “that the bottom, marginalized, and scorned…are in reality filled with solutions.” This bottom-up vision is also reflected in the administration’s response to COVID-19. On April 5th, AMLO unveiled an economic package in the National Palace to confront the adverse effects of COVID-19 on the economy. That package largely focused on small businesses (microempresas) and the informal economy. In response to critics of the package, AMLO stated that “there is not going to be a rescue for big companies, banks, much less the biggest.” Such a statement would have been anathema to any of the previous administrations, wedded as they were to a vision of corporate Mexico.

Yet, there are contradictions in the Fourth Transformation (4T), the label AMLO and MORENA have given to the administration’s policies. While the public health policy is rhetorically about the universal right to healthcare, the budget has not reflected a sufficient economic investment to provide such a right. Although, it’s important to note, that in theory no one in Mexico will have to go into debt for treatment, unlike in the United States. But this may be of little consolation if there is little to no healthcare facilities to access. Furthermore, the years of hollowing out from neoliberalization have left the public system without a sufficient number of hospital beds to treat COVID-19 patients. This fact led to a voluntary agreement with private hospitals on the part of the government. The agreement will have the government cover costs at private hospitals for treatment, which will mean the government becomes a source of profit for those entities that in pre-COVID-19 times excluded the majority from healthcare.

Additionally, the economic response to COVID-19 crisis in Mexico does not lend itself to a Keynesian conception of counter-cyclical spending. The creditos solidarios of 25,000 pesos for up to a million micro-businesses are relatively small, although they do not have to be paid back. The other micro-credits the government is dispensing reproduce a neoliberal policy that was popular with NGOs. Businesses that receive these small loans will have to pay them back within three years, even though there is no clear indication that they will keep businesses afloat or out of a cycle of debt. Even more, the refusal to raise taxes or create new taxes means that the government will have limited fiscal options to expand programs without accumulating debt, also rejected by AMLO.

Much of these contradictions arise from AMLO’s “austeridad republicana”. That has involved cutting government salaries, moves against corruption, and at times, reductions in budgets to certain agencies. It is based on a not incorrect belief that the state misallocates funds, because the neoliberal state had become a support for businesses, rather than the public good. It is from this idea that debt rejection arises, whether private or from international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, as a vehicle for funding government programs. And, this is understandable, as debt has been a primary way that privatization was pushed, just as corruption has been an endemic problem for Mexico. But, it also means that AMLO’s transformation of Mexico away from neoliberalism takes place within a state already constrained by four decades of neoliberalism.

It is not clear that what is entailed in the 4T is a transformation of Mexico’s political economy, or that it will be sufficient to address the COVID-19 crisis. Or, possibly better put, there is a lack of confrontation with the entrenched oligarchy, ever ready to use capital strike, capital flight, and other measures to stall the economy and harm the chances of a Left-led revitalization. One can only speculate as to why AMLO and his administration do not act more aggressively, whether it is current international conditions, too much emphasis on corruption and not enough on class struggle, or a general philosophy of “doing more with less”.

Of course, AMLO is constrained, as Mexico can’t just print money like the US, and there isn’t a commodity boom to finance the expansion of a welfare state. Actually, there is the exact opposite, an oil crash harming a state that receives large amounts of its funding from the sale of oil. As well, AMLO is constantly attacked in national and international media outlets, with his administration’s move under a magnifying glass to make claims about authoritarianism. Plus, the peso has been consistently devalued over the past decade eroding purchasing power, with an ever-present threat of inflation cutting purchasing power even more. Thus, there are clear reasons that AMLO and his administration seek a route that seeks to re-orient the state within current coordinates, as opposed to a more frontal challenge to Mexico’s class structure and entrenched corporate power.

AMLO and his administration are correct in noting the corrosive effects of neoliberalization on Mexico and human dignity. And many moves should be commended, such as Insabi. And, there is the expanded role of the Fondo de Cultura Economica in supplying discounted books to the populous under the directorship of Paco Ignacio Taibo II. That is, AMLO and his administration have produced an ideological space that provides real opportunities for 4T, for a political economy to transition away from neoliberalization and for a general education of the populous about demands that should be made on the state. But for now, with austeridad republicana the policy driving this transition, 4T is much less than promised. And that will be more than problematic, as the COVID dead mount and 4T stalls.

April 24, 2020

Care is not essential


By Iván Sandoval-Cervantes

Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Although some news sources have highlighted the importance of differentiating between “physical distance” and “social distance”—emphasizing how “social distancing” might imply isolation, which is not good for mental wellbeing (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/physical-distancing-social-distancing-200330143325112.html)—while “physical distancing” still allows us to be “alone, together”. The argument is that even when you cannot take care of someone physically, you can still show that you care about someone remotely. It is, of course, perfectly understandable that experts recommend physical distancing in order to slow down the spread of COVID-19. However, for some people the physical distancing and the restrictions of movement that it entails result in the impossibility of caring, in addition to being able to take care of someone. As we rely more and more on different forms of care to stay alive, and to stay healthy, we risk redefining what forms of care are permissible in a permanent way and without taking into account how different communities continue to see care and respect in physical ways that are seen as movements of contagion. This is particularly true in cultural contexts where the expectation is that care and affection are physical as well as emotional expressions.
As a Mexican anthropologist who has lived in the United States for almost ten years, it has become evident that discussions of care in the times of COVID-19 occasionally ignore how in some cultural contexts the expectation is that care and affection are to be expressed physically and emotionally. Thus, here I want to briefly discuss what care means in other contexts, particularly in the Mexico-U.S. border and in Mexico.
In the middle of April, my grandmother passed away in El Paso, Texas. My mother, who had been one of her main caregivers, wasn’t able to say good-bye. Although my mother lives just a few miles away, she couldn’t visit her mother one last time as she lives in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and her crossing to El Paso, Texas was therefore deemed as “non-essential” (anecdotally, others have reported that they have been threatened to have their crossing documents removed if they attempt to cross again). In fact, my mother hadn’t seen my grandmother in three weeks: the last time she visited with her was when the closing of the Mexico-U.S. border was announced on March 20th. I clearly remember texting her to inform her that the border was to be closed, so that she wouldn’t get stuck in El Paso, which,—of course, she already knew. My grandmother did not die of COVID-19, but the current state of affairs limited who was able to say goodbye and to show her they cared one last time.
I am well aware that my family is not the only one in going through this. Numerous migrant families-- families divided by borders and migratory status--are facing the tough challenge of showing their loved ones that they care for them from afar. Many will probably reach a point where remote caring will not be enough, even while other forms of caring will be labelled as non-essential.
In this context, even if we celebrate care-workers, we still consider other forms of care as not essential. Some forms of care are even seen as dangerous. It has barely been a month since universities “transitioned” to online classes and we were instructed to practice “physical distancing,” and already some forms of care are being questioned as non-essential, dangerous, and as things to be avoided.
In early April, Dr. Anthony Fauci, who has gained national recognition as one of the nation’s top infectious disease experts, stipulated that the handshake could become a thing of the past: “just forget about shaking hands. We don’t need to shake hands. We’ve got to break that custom”, he said (https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/coronavirus-pandemic-04-08-20/h_9d387b68d1c653f0bb54cb0d866fb3b6). But for some communities, shaking hands is not merely a “greeting,” it can also be a showing of respect. In Zegache, Oaxaca, where I did my doctoral fieldwork, the “handshake” is not so much a “shake” as it is a soft, momentary holding of someone’s hand. There’s no shaking, just an acknowledgement of somebody’s else presence. It is a sign of respect, not an expression of one’s personality like in the U.S. (https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennifercohen/2015/06/02/7-super-revealing-things-your-handshake-says-about-you/).
The evils of handshaking in the times of COVID-19 made headlines in Mexican newspapers when Mexico’s president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, commonly known as AMLO, shook the hand of the mother of the infamous Joaquin “Chapo” Guzman while touring the northwestern state of Sinaloa (while facing pressures to send a stronger message regarding physical distancing) (https://www.chicagotribune.com/espanol/sns-es-coronavirus-amlo-estrecha-mano-madre-chapo-20200330-yn2p27drb5c6fi4m636vgfpg64-story.html). A lot could, and has, been said about what the encounter between AMLO and Chapo’s mother means, but here I want to focus on AMLO’s response when questioned about the incident. “I am not a robot. I have feelings”, he said, emphasizing how he couldn’t refuse to shake an elderly’s woman hand. It was a sign of respect (https://www.forbes.com.mx/politica-como-voy-a-dejar-la-mano-tendida-adulta-mayor-dice-amlo-saludo-madre-el-chapo/).
Meanwhile, in other parts of Mexico, health professionals, those in charge of providing care for those who are suffering from COVID-19 are being targeted as hazardous and contagious. Some nurses have been told that they “are bringing the COVID-19” as they try to board the bus or go to the grocery store (https://verne.elpais.com/verne/2020/04/13/mexico/1586810735_002679.html).
Care, in some of these instances, is not only seen as non-essential but as potentially dangerous, a source of contagion. As the world braces itself for what is to come, and we try to grasp what it means for something to be “essential”, we are redefining how we express care. This redefinition might be momentary but it could become permanent. For some people, like my mother, who was told that being there for my grandmother was not “essential”. This non-essentiality of saying goodbye to one’s parents was only detected because it required the crossing of an international border. The handshake as a sign of care and respect might disappear, as Dr. Fauci suggested. The question remains: what will care look like once we are no longer physically isolated?

March 5, 2020

Political Report # 1435 The Tren Maya and the remaking of Mexico's south






Political Report # 1435

The Tren Maya and the remaking of Mexico's south


Cameras rolled as dozens of members of Mexico’s National Guard formed a tight line, and, holding up shields and batons, pushed forward into a group of Central American migrants. They sprayed tear gas, forcing people to disperse towards the border with Guatemala. Images of families running in panic and fear flooded social networks. Parents were separated from their children. During the first month of 2020, at least 2,000 people were deported from Mexico and many hundreds detained.

The deployment of the National Guard –a military force of soldiers, Federal Police, marines and new recruits– is but the most visceral element of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s plan to control migration in Mexico’s south. Another is the Tren Maya, a train across the Yucatán peninsula, which is the largest infrastructure project proposed by Mexico’s new president.

The National Development Plan (PND), the guiding policy document of López Obrador’s presidency, states that the peninsular train will serve to contain northward migration by “generating employment and conditions of dignified life to attract and anchor those who are fleeing poverty.” But critics liken the train to a border wall without bricks, and say the project has more to do with displacement than it does with transportation.

“As we’ve been saying since the outset, the main problem isn’t the train itself, rather, it’s what comes with the train,” said Pedro Uc, a Mayan activist and writer from the town of Buctzotz, Yucatán. “We think they could connect the Trans-Isthmus corridor to this project and that it will become… A wall without bricks, which will be used to contain the people coming up from Central America,” said Uc. He predicted that new cities could swell as service industry jobs connected to mass tourism are created along the train’s route. “That will obviously have repercussions in the lives of people and communities.”

The Trans-Isthmus corridor that Uc mentions is an existing freight path of rail lines and highways connecting the Pacific and Atlantic. The isthmus is the narrowest part of the map of Mexico, and the corridor across it is another in the series of infrastructure project proposed by the current government.

The Yucatan Peninsula, which is made up of the states of Campeche, Yucatan and Quintana Roo, juts northeast from the isthmus into the Caribbean. Like the peninsular train, the idea of a Trans-Isthmus corridor has been floated before, but this time, the government seems set on making the controversial proposals reality.

Indeed, the peninsular train is best understood as part of a series of strategic infrastructure and social programs promoted by President López Obrador, who is known in Mexico as AMLO. Others include the Trans-Isthmus corridor, a free trade zone along the Mexico-US border, and a program called Sembrando Vida, in which small farmers plant fruit trees in return for monthly payments.

“This combination of mega-projects and infrastructure, when we lay them out on a map… are de facto elements of a ‘migrant barrier’ which respond to the geopolitical interests of the United States,” according to Dr. Sergio Prieto, a professor at Ecosur in Campeche, in southern Mexico. According to the peninsular train’s official website, it “is a comprehensive project of territorial organization, infrastructure, economic growth and sustainable tourism.” It is the promise of “territorial organization” that most worries local activists.

“Many ecologists and environmentalists have been focusing on where the tracks will be laid, how many trees will be cut, and the animals,” said Abraham Villaseñor, an urbanist and resident of Calakmul, a town slated to host a station along the train’s southern route. “We think that’s too simplistic, and that those who are promoting the project are pushing the discussion into that terrain,” he said during an interview on the front porch of his home. It is easier for the government to talk about reforestation, after all, than it is to talk about the impacts of building new cities and promoting mass tourism in peasant and Indigenous communities.

The Tren Maya and the model of Cancun

Calakmul is a rural municipality located deep in the biosphere reserve of the same name. Calakmul is also the name of an impressive archeological area that was pillaged and looted for nearly a century before it was officially recognized by the Mexican government in 1994. Although still relatively difficult to access, the 300-foot-tall pyramids at Calakmul are held up as a key draw for the thousands of tourists who would arrive, theoretically, to the area every day once the southern line of the peninsular train is up and running.

When the peninsular train was first announced, there was talk of building Comprehensive Planned Centers (CIP) along the route. “We said, ‘Hey, what you’re planning is, in this day and age, a new Cancun in an area like Calakmul, where the fragility of the ecosystem has already shown its limits,’” said Villaseñor as he sat back to pet his cat. “Why would they want to repeat the mistakes of Cancun?”

For tourists, Cancun elicits elysian afternoons, white sand beaches, all-inclusive hotels and partying on the strip. But for many who live in smaller towns and communities near Cancun, the word is synonymous with inequality, exploitation, environmental collapse and, more recently, state and paramilitary violence connected to the militarization of the drug trade. Last year, Cancun averaged one murder a day. In the first month of 2020, there were over 50 killings in the city.

Cancun’s transformation from sparsely populated natural area to tourist behemoth began in the early 1970s when it became the first CIP built by the Mexican government. Today, the city has a population of over 600,000 and offers up more than 100,000 hotel rooms. In 2019, Cancun received over 13 million passengers by air, and another seven million visitors by cruise ship.

The Riviera Maya, which includes Cancun, Playa del Carmen and Tulum, is a major moneymaker for private hotel companies and for the Mexican government, which is determined to spread the tourist dollars around the peninsula. The idea is that some of the tourists streaming into Cancun would ride the peninsular train to visit colonial cities, archeological sites, and natural areas. In addition to passengers, the train is also slated to carry cargo, including hydrocarbons.

Hard facts about the peninsular train are sparse and the details ever-changing.

Here’s what we know so far. The train itself would run along approximately 930 miles of track. Cancun would connect with stations at tourist destinations large and small, all the way south to Chetumal. From Tulum, a train line would run west, with stops at Valladolid, Mérida and Campeche. A southern line would turn west across the peninsula at the fragile turquoise lakes of Bacalar. The southern and northern lines would meet in the town of Escárcega, where a single track would bring passengers to the terminus station in Palenque, Chiapas.

The train is to have 30 stops, 19 of which would host train stations. It would pass through 112 municipalities. Work for the northern route has started along existing tracks, and new tracks along the southern route are set to be laid this year. Carlos Slim, the country’s richest man, supports the project and successfully pushed for a new route so the train won’t compete with a toll highway he controls. To this day, the exact location of the tracks and stations has not been made public, though official documents note that most of the route will run parallel to existing federal infrastructure such as power lines and highways.

There is little official information about the new urban areas the federal government is proposing to build at the 19 train stations, which have also been called CIPs, “development poles,” or “new urban nuclei.” These areas are expected to involve housing, hotels, and shopping malls, representing a strong break with rural life and holding the potential to displace communal landowners.

One report stated the new city in Calakmul could become home to 50,000 people and receive three million tourists a year. To put that into context, the 2015 population of the more than 80 ejidos (agrarian communities) that make up Calakmul was 28,000; the largest of these, Xpujil, has a population of about 4,000.

To date, there is no detailed information on water supply, sewage, or garbage disposal for the proposed cities. These are not minor issues since people across the peninsula rely on septic tanks, there is no water treatment, and garbage is often burned.

Train tracks, train cars and train maintenance is estimated to cost between six and eight billion dollars. But that estimate doesn’t include the stations. The still-vague proposals for financing the project hint at the lack of basic information. Initially, the Mexican government said it would pay 10 percent of the cost of the train, with the rest coming from private investment. In October, the National Fund for Tourism Development (FONATUR) upped the estimate of the government’s share to 30 percent. Then, in December, AMLO said the entirety of the project would be financed by the Mexican government. FONATUR maintains they are still expecting significant private investment.

Further complicating the proposal to build new cities is the fact that much of the land in the Yucatán peninsula is held collectively through ejidos, collective rural landholding associations which were still being created well into the 1960s as the Mexican government promoted new settlement in the region.

The government has proposed the creation of the Infrastructure and Real Estate Trust, called FIBRA for short, which would rent land from collective landowners to build train stations and urban centers. “It’s not about selling, it’s about organizing and then receiving long-term rental payments so that [collective landholders] are not displaced,” said Rogelio Jimenez Pons, head of FONATUR, in an interview with El Financiero. “If an important investor arrives and wants to invest in a mall or a hotel, it isn’t sold, it’s rented, and the vehicle for doing so is a trust.”

 But according to Dr. Violeta Núñez Rodríguez, who researches mega-projects at the Autonomous University of Mexico in Xochimilco, the involvement of communal landowners in the project is much more complicated than it appears. In order to legally lease to FIBRA, she said, these landholders, known as ejidatarios, would have to become private landholders. This is a lengthy and complicated process that is often met with community resistance.

In addition, the land trust as proposed would be listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange, subjecting rural landowners to the whims of the market. “There is a large element of risk. Part of that risk is what we call variable rent, which is not guaranteed and which, depending on the stock exchange, could impact the investments made,” said Núñez Rodríguez. In addition, because the FIBRA would list shares on the stock exchange, decision-making power would lay with majority shareholders, not with the landowners.

Activists dispute the idea that long-term leases (50-80 year contracts) or the use of a land trust would prevent the displacement of farming communities from their lands. “It’s displacement, even though they don’t want to say it,” said Villaseñor. “It’s displacement.”

Sham Consultations

The planned completion date for the project is ambitious: the train is to be up and running by 2024, in time for AMLO to inaugurate the project before he leaves office at the end of his six-year term. The politically influenced timeline means plans for the peninsular train have barrelled ahead.

On November 15, FONATUR announced it would carry out information sessions at the end of the month, and on December 15th, it organized a vote for or against the project in 15 Indigenous communities in the peninsula. This vote took place before communities had access to basic information about the plan, such as the train’s route, the location of stations, and other development associated with the project.

“It all happened so fast. It overwhelmed us,” said Sara López, who is part of the Regional Indigenous and Popular Council of Xpujil (CRIPX), which is part of Mexico’s National Indigenous Congress. “It wasn’t prior consultation, nor was it free, nor was it in good faith. It wasn’t adequate. The people were not properly informed,” she said during an interview outside a small hotel in the town of Xpujil, which is the municipal center of Calakmul.

Few places could feel farther from Cancun than Xpujil: the dry, dark nights are incredibly quiet, and lodging is extremely modest (I stayed in a wooden bungalow with a fan and a mosquito net for $10 a night). There’s no five star hotels with swimming pools in Xpujil for a number of reasons: to date, tourism has been led by adventurous travelers seeking to reach the out-of-the-way archeological site, but also, and much more importantly, there’s no water.

One resident of Xpujil told me water had only flowed from the municipal water system through the pipes in his home three times over the past five months. For the most part, water is delivered by truck.

In small clearings in the woods all around Calakmul, peasant and Mayan communities practice small-scale agriculture and beekeeping, but there is no irrigation. Crops depend entirely on rainfall, which has been less frequent in past years, leading to crop failure and causing some families to go hungry. It is in this context that the Tren Maya has been presented to communities as a panacea, a solution for all the problems they’re facing.

On November 30, ejido leaders were brought from throughout Calakmul to the information session in Xpujil. Numerous sources confirmed that a government flyer being read aloud in Cho’l by a young woman was the extent of available translation.

At the information sessions, government representatives “…only said good things. They talked about all the benefits the Tren Maya would bring,” said López during our interview in Xpujil. Officials promised that if the train was built, an aqueduct would also be put in, solving the water problem. They said the train would allow farmers to get their products to market. “They still haven’t told us where the train is going to go,” said López. “There’s no environmental impact statement.”

On December 15th, the day of the vote, the ballot asked the following question: “Are you in agreement with the construction of the Integral Project of the Tren Maya?” In small print above the question, voters were asked to turn over the ballot and read the text on the other side, which reiterated the promise of jobs, connectivity, and sustainable development if the train is built. It was in these conditions that 92.3 percent of voters cast ballots in favor of the train.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR), which was invited to observe the consultation process, found the vote did not meet international standards, as only positive information about the project was available to community members beforehand.

In an official communiqué, the UNHCR observed that “people from the communities expressed their agreement with the project as a means to bring attention to their basic necessities like water, health care, education, employment, housing, a healthy environment and culture. This logic affected the ‘free’ character of the consultation.”

Sources I spoke with saw these consultations as a form of what Mexicans call “simulación,” which is when the government pretends to do something it is actually not doing. The government’s goal, they said, was to convince people in Mexico City that local communities support the project. In mid-January, a judge in Campeche State granted a provisional suspension halting work on the train following a legal complaint against the consultations brought by CRIPX. Authorities responded by saying they had not been advised of the order. The first tracks are set to be laid this year.

The day after the consultations on the peninsular train, Mayan land defender Pedro Uc and his son received death threats via Whatsapp.

Uc believes these threats were made on behalf of Jinko Solar, a company that’s proposed a massive solar energy project in Valladolid, that has also been delayed as part of a legal battle. Regardless of the threats and the real risks faced by activists in Mexico, Uc says he won’t stand down in defense of the land.

“We won’t stop fighting for what we believe in: the land we live on, which is the only thing we have,” he said in a phone interview from his home in Buctzotz. “If they take that away, it’s all over.”






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