Showing posts with label Free Trade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Free Trade. Show all posts

March 9, 2018

Political Report # 1318 Western Media Hail Ecuador's Cynical President Moreno



By Joe Emersberger

FAIR


In an article for the British Guardian (2/2/18), Dan Collyns wrote:
But since taking office, Moreno-the world's only wheelchair-using head of state-has made good on his pledge to be his own man.
What Lenín Moreno actually pledged during his election campaign several months ago was to continue the "Citizens Revolution" of Rafael Correa, whose left-wing government Moreno was part of for 10 years. Moreno called Correa the greatest president Ecuador ever had during the campaign. And here is a video of Moreno leading a crowd in cheers of "Rafael! Rafael!" at a campaign rally.
Moreno is now, through a referendum that he never proposed on the campaign trail-it was actually proposed by his right-wing opponent-asking voters to  (retroactively) re-impose term limits, handpick a body with "transitional" powers to fire 150 authorities (judges, prosecutors, regulators etc....) and drastically reduce taxes on wealthy land-speculators. Moreno did not campaign for any of those things.
He is now also talking about a "free trade" deal with the United States-another policy he would never have dared to propose while he needed Correa's support to get elected. Further, Moreno has given Ecuador's private banks exclusive control over electronic money-which he never would have proposed while he needed Correa.  In 1999, the private banks, after years of corruption and deregulation, totally crashed Ecuador's economy.  Reining them in, including their media power, was key to the economic success Ecuador had under Correa.
In short, as many Latin American politicians did during the neoliberal '80s and '90s, Moreno campaigned left then governed from the right.  Wasn't Moreno perfectly free to "be his own man" as a presidential candidate, by resigning from Correa's government and running as the right-wing politician that he became after the votes were counted?

September 26, 2017

Abstracts, Resisting Neoliberalism in Colombia: The Role of Human Rights

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Resisting Neoliberalism in Colombia: The Role of Human Rights
by Paul A. Chambers


The Colombian government’s noncompliance with the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement’s Labor Action Plan calls into question not only the government’s intentions but also the efficacy of human rights activism and discourse for social resistance to neoliberalism. Colombia has managed to adjust the narrative on human rights and improve its international image, paving the way for U.S. ratification of the free-trade agreement despite the fact that the human rights situation continues to be very serious. Its success in this is due to the way in which the debate on the agreement and human rights was framed—with a very narrow focus on trade unionists’ rights and a discourse that did not link civil and political rights to economic and social rights—and to the ideological affinity between neoliberalism and the dominant liberal discourse on human rights.

August 23, 2017

Political Report # 1273 Renegotiating NAFTA Will Only Serve the Rich -- Just Like It Always Has

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect at midnight on January 1, 1994. That night, thousands of Indigenous Mayans rose up in arms in the southeastern Mexican state of Chiapas, seizing at least five towns and declaring NAFTA a "death certificate" for people like themselves. This was just the beginning of Mexico's troubles in a year that brought countless protests, hotly disputed elections and the assassinations of two of the then-ruling party's leaders. 1994 ended with a sudden devaluation of the peso, the start of an economic collapse from which the country didn't recover fully for years.
NAFTA is back in the news this month: On August 16, US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer met with his counterparts from Canada and Mexico, the other two NAFTA nations, to open talks on renegotiating the pact.
While it's true that NAFTA was just one of the many problems Mexico had in the 1990s, we have to wonder, given the renewed focus on the trade accord, why US mainstream media have carried so little discussion of the events that accompanied NAFTA's rollout in Mexico. The reason may be a consensus among opinion makers about NAFTA and similar trade pacts.
It is an article of faith across party lines that these accords are beneficial to our trading partners in the Global South. On the right, we have President Trump, who told CBS during the campaign that "Mexico ... is taking our jobs. I love the Mexican people. They're great people. But the leadership is too smart for our country.... We're being defrauded by all these countries." On the other side, we have commentators who insist that NAFTA's been good for the US economy but still go along with Trump's claim that Mexicans benefit from it. Some even assert that these trade pacts are the only hope for the developing world.

July 24, 2017

Abstract, The United States and Latin America in the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Renewing Hegemony in a Post–Washington Consensus Hemisphere?

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The United States and Latin America in the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Renewing Hegemony in a Post–Washington Consensus Hemisphere?
by Rubrick Biegon                  


The nascent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement puts the United States at the center of an expanding liberalization regime connecting the Americas to the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. power is bound up with the globalization of Latin America’s political economy, and the TPP is indicative of U.S. efforts to renew its hegemony in the region. It reinforces the importance of “free trade” on the post–Washington Consensus agenda, undercutting existing Latin American–led approaches to integration while responding to China’s growing influence in the hemisphere. As the free-trade consensus is reconstructed through the TPP process, U.S. hegemony in the Americas is potentially extended even as it continues to face challenges in the structural, institutional, and ideological dimensions of intrahemispheric affairs.


August 8, 2016

Political Report # 1169 Free Trade is Killing Colombian Labor Activists




Police during International workers day on May 1, 2016, in Bogotá, Colombia. (Daniel Garzón Herazo / Pacific Press, Sipa via AP Images)



By  Michelle Chen, The Nation




Though Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have both said they oppose the Trans-Pacific partnership-at least in its current form-they've hedged on trade issues overall, while the Obama administration continues to slide the treaty through Congress. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party remains ideologically tied to neoliberal policies for opening more "free markets," despite potential impacts on labor and economic standards around the Pacific Rim.
But if past is prologue, it's time to revisit another trade pact that candidate Barack Obama rebuffed in 2008-back then he cited human-rights abuses against labor activists. The US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement ultimately did get enacted, however, and eight years on, despite lowering trade barriers and fueling an export market worth about $17 billion, it has left a labor movement in tatters, replicating a pattern of neoliberal trade ravaging the hemisphere.
American workers are increasingly wary of NAFTA-like free-trade policies that are historically associated with the hemorrhaging of many blue-collar jobs. But the losses for our "trade partners" in the Global South are often paid in blood. According to a complaint recently filed by AFL-CIO with the Department of Labor, Colombia's political climate is just as, if not more, hostile toward trade unionists as it was before the trade treaty was enacted.

February 12, 2016

Political Report # 1114 Bleak Prospects for Latin America Under Trans-Pacific Partnership By Ian Gustafson, Research Associate at COHA



Featured Photo: A summit with leaders of the member states of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) in 2010. Pictured, from left, are Naoto Kan (Japan), Nguyễn Minh Triết (Vietnam), Julia Gillard (Australia), Sebastián Piñera(Chile), Lee Hsien Loong (Singapore), Barack Obama (United States), John Key (New Zealand), Hassanal Bolkiah (Brunei), Alan García (Peru), and Muhyiddin Yassin (Malaysia). Six of these leaders represent countries that are currently negotiating to join the group. (Gobierno de Chile)




By Ian Gustafson, Research Associate at COHA




The Trans-Pacific Partnership, agreed to on October 5, 2015 by the twelve participating countries, is likely to prove disastrous for the Latin American states-Chile, Mexico, and Perú-that have joined the pact up to now. Multinational economic interests based in the United States have exerted extraordinary influence over the accord, inserting language that will arguably serve to damage Latin American interests.
Though the TPP has often been presented as a disinterested effort to stimulate basic economic growth and development in the Pacific Rim, the economic principles that underlay the TPP may instead serve to advance the interests of the world's leading corporations. U.S. President Barack Obama promised in a statement that the TPP would slash over 18,000 foreign taxes that the U.S. faces for its exports.[1] Despite being heralded as a path to prosperity for developing countries, eliminating protectionist measures in countries like Chile, Perú, and Mexico could prove to be very harmful.
The great nineteenth century German economist Friedrich List argued that developed countries calling for expanded free trade in less developed countries is hypocritical as well as misleading.  As List put it, "it is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him."[2]
Britain and the United States, which historically have been unflagging proponents of free trade for developing countries, both adopted free trade policies only after they were technologically advanced enough not to need protectionist policies.[3] Britain adopted free trade in the mid-nineteenth century, while the United States eliminated its highly protectionist policies only in the early twentieth century.
The unprecedented productivity gap that exists today between developed and developing countries makes high tariffs and other support for infant industries even more necessary to provide protection and foster the conditions under which today's advanced countries developed, according to Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang.[4]
The United States' promotion of free trade in the Trans-Pacific Partnership ignores its own history and could set a troubling course for the Latin American states involved, which will now have an even more difficult time competing in global markets. The TPP, whose twelve members represent some 40 percent of the global economy, pits two of the world's three biggest economies (the U.S. and Japan) against much smaller states in a productivity battle.[5] It will not be a fair fight, but neither is it guaranteed that any adjustation of the free trade zone will necessarily bring economic justice to some of the poorest countries in the world.
Even the most ardent defenders of free trade ideology acknowledge that there are certain conditions under which protectionism is the better policy, conditions that are present in the Latin American countries taking part in the TPP. Economists of international trade agree that improving a country's terms of trade-the ratio of the price of goods it exports to the price of goods it imports-is unequivocally beneficial.[6] Tariffs improve a country's terms of trade, because a tariff will lower demand for the imported good and increase demand for the now relatively less-expensive domestically produced product. Latin American states generally export lower-priced goods and thus have quite a bit to gain from improving terms of trade; the TPP hampers the potential for these gains by eliminating tariffs on goods from more developed states.
Pro-Corporate Regulations
Besides promising some potential macroeconomic difficulties for the Latin American countries involved, the TPP also includes provisions to allow big corporations to undertake more unrestricted and potentially predatory behavior.
One part of the agreement that has been generating quite a bit of criticism from the left is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Program, or ISDS. The ISDS permits companies to sue governments directly if they believe any TPP country has legislation that could restrict their potential future profits, with the hearing before a tribunal of three private sector lawyers operating under United Nations guidelines.[7] U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Massachusetts) has argued that this provision will violate the sovereignty of individual country's legislative bodies and provide far too much leverage for corporations.
Senator Warren also condemned the TPP's ISDS program for not providing adequate safeguards for impartiality. "ISDS could lead to gigantic fines, but it wouldn't employ independent judges," she noted. "Instead, highly paid corporate lawyers would go back and forth between representing corporations one day and sitting in judgment the next."[8]
The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Program, which also exists in other trade agreements, does not directly override laws, but imposes a financial penalty for regulations that are restrictive to big business.[9] This provides a financial incentive for states to be lax in their regulations, and will likely force smaller states to give in to corporate demands or else risk stiff financial penalties. For less-developed Latin American states which do not have the discretionary government funds that some other countries do, this issue will be particularly acute. Further, taxpayers will have to pay the legal defense bills when their nations decide to take on the corporate titans.
The ISDS is not the only section of the Trans-Pacific Partnership that will potentially provide corporate interests with ruinous power at the expense of less developed nations. Language from the trade pact suggests that it will be far more difficult for generics to challenge brand-name pharmaceuticals abroad, and that there is a serious possibility for monopolistic competition in that industry with the passing of the TPP.[10]
The TPP's treatment of the pharmaceutical industry has sparked controversy because it requires eight years of data exclusivity for all prescriptions for all countries except Australia.[11] This lack of transparency for drug companies would make it impossible for TPP countries to make a generic version of new drugs. Language from the TPP also suggests that negotiating bulk purchases of drugs from these companies will be significantly more expensive for governments that use such bulk purchases for aid programs and prisoners.[12]
Doctors without Borders suggested in a press release that, "The TPP agreement is on track to become the most harmful trade pact ever for access to medicines in developing countries."[13] Restriction of access to affordable drugs will deny a fundamental human right to the poor, and could become a devastating burden for the people in TPP's Latin American countries. Preventing generic medicines from entering the market is particularly devastating in light of the ascension of India's revolutionary generics program that has made life-saving medicines accessible to even its poorest citizens, a model that could be implemented in Latin America if not for these regulations.
Some commentators have suggested that the TPP is at its core a geopolitical maneuver by the U.S. and any economic benefit from the agreement is really a secondary consideration. There certainly is some truth to this statement. The United States is desperate to follow through on President Obama's "pivot to Asia" and establish a foothold there to combat growing Chinese geo-political power. The TPP provides just the vehicle for them to do so.
Many analysts agree that Obama's argument that the trade pact will be a stanchion against China's power in Southeast Asia will be an effective cudgel in his efforts to get Congress to pass the deal.[14] Another important geopolitical consideration that likely motivated America's leadership in this endeavor was the tension between the United States and Japan in recent decades over trade policy. The TPP is meant to assuage any concerns that Japan, one of America's most vital allies, might have about future trade wars with the U.S.[15]
Despite all the rhetoric that the U.S. espouses about lifting countries out of poverty with free trade and economic union, a significant reason for the U.S. to lead the way in establishing the Trans-Pacific Partnership was geopolitical concerns. It is manipulative for America to involve poor Latin American countries in Washington's global political ambitions, especially when that involvement comes with a potential hit to economic health.
NAFTA's Foreboding Example
 An illuminating example of how seemingly well-intentioned free trade agreements can end up exacerbating inequality within designated countries and unfairly benefitting American corporations, as the TPP seems poised to repeat, is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was enacted in 1993 and implemented in 1994.
In the aftermath of NAFTA's inception, two million Mexican agricultural laborers lost their jobs and eight million farmers were forced to sell off their land at fire-sale prices.[16] They simply could not compete with more technologically advanced American farming, especially in producing corn, which remained heavily subsidized in the United States. The suffering of Mexican farmers under free trade terms is a stirring example of Friedrich List's "kicking away the ladder" thesis, and should provide a cautionary note for additional Latin American countries joining the TPP.
In fact, the World Bank's poverty headcount ratio metric for Mexico displays a higher proportion of people in poverty there today than before NAFTA's passage in the early 1990's, and inequality has widened in the country by several metrics.[17] It is easy to imagine the TPP having similar results for its Latin American members.
Further, the regulations that NAFTA eliminated in Mexico had served as a valuable safety net for many poor Mexicans. Provisions of the agreement forced the liquidation of the Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO), or the National Company of Popular Subsistence, which for years had prevented monopoly control and price speculation to protect basic commodities and staple foods. In early 2007, a 67 percent increase in the price of tortillas left many impoverished Mexicans hungry and desolate without the price guarantees CONASUPO had offered.[18] The ISDS portion of the TPP threatens to spell doom for protective regulations like CONASUPO that would restrict corporations from exploitative practices that would jeopardize the welfare of Latin America's poorest residents.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership's terms have only recently been fully disclosed by the participating countries, and early indications suggest that this could be a very harmful agreement for the Latin American states involved. Creating a favorable climate for business to operate in was clearly a major goal, as was slashing the trade barriers that would force nascent Latin American industries to compete with more developed economies. Only time will tell what the practical repercussions will be, but additional Latin American states should exercise caution while considering joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Certainly more profound dialogue is needed.

[1] The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 2015. Web. 8 Oct. 2015
[2] Chang, Ha-Joon. "Kicking Away the Ladder: Infant Industry Promotion in Historical Perspective." Oxford Development Studies. Volume 31, No. 1, 2003. Page 24.
[3] Chang, Ha-Joon. "Kicking Away the Ladder: Infant Industry Promotion in Historical Perspective." Oxford Development Studies. Volume 31, No. 1, 2003. Page 25.
[4] Chang, Ha-Joon. "Kicking Away the Ladder: Infant Industry Promotion in Historical Perspective." Oxford Development Studies. Volume 31, No. 1, 2003. Page 27.
[5] Granville, Kevin. "The Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Explained." The New York Times, August 1, 2015.
[6] Irwin, Douglas. Free Trade Under Fire (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), Page 99.
[7] Sargent, Greg. "Elizabeth Warren fires back at Obama: Here's what they're really fighting about". The Washington Post, May 11, 2015.
[8] Warren, Elizabeth. "The Trans-Pacific Partnership clause everyone should oppose". The Washington Post, February 25, 2015.
[9] Sargent, Greg. "Elizabeth Warren fires back at Obama: Here's what they're really fighting about". The Washington Post, May 11, 2015.
[10] Grunwald, Michael. "Leaked: What's in Obama's Trade Deal". Politico.
[11] McGregor, Jaynce. "Spin Cycle: Will joining the TPP increase drug costs?" CBC News, October 16, 2015.
[12] McGregor, Jaynce. "Spin Cycle: Will joining the TPP increase drug costs?" CBC News, October 16, 2015.
[13] Doctors Without Borders. Trading Away Health: The Trans-Pacific Partnership. 2015. Web 11 October 2015
[14] Calmes, Jackie. "Trans-Pacific Partnership is reached, but faces scrutiny in Congress." The New York Times, October 5, 2015.
[15] Solís, Mireya. "The geopolitical importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: At stake, a liberal economic order". The Brookings Institute, March 13, 2015.
[16] "The Failures of NAFTA". The Council on Hemispheric Affairs. June 19, 2012. Accessed October 15, 2015.
[17] "Poverty and Equity". The World Bank. 2015. Accessed October 15, 2015.
[18] "The Trans-Pacific Partnership". Bilterals.org, 2015. Accessed October 13, 2015.






Article and sources can be found:
http://www.coha.org/bleak-prospects-for-latin-america-under-trans-pacific-partnership/

July 9, 2015

Political Report # 1055 TPP: Free Trade or Corporate Interests? By Chandler Foust, COHA


                              

                          Leader of TPP Member States. From: Gobierno de Chile.




By Chandler Foust, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs 
 
On June 12, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) while rejecting Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). The Senate version of the bill, with TAA and TPA adjoined, passed. Typically, a bill such as TAA would have strong Democratic support because it provides assistance to individuals who lose jobs due to trade deals. However, since the bills were separate in the House and adjoined in the Senate, House Democrats voted it down to prevent TPA from being signed into law. Many Democrats opposed TPA because if signed into law, President Obama would have fast track authority to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which many Democrats are against. By rejecting TAA, House Democrats forced the Senate to separate the TAA from the TPA and vote on it again.

President Obama was then left to rely on Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner to deliver the legislation, and they came through. On June 25, the Senate voted to pass TPA, without TAA, which means that the bill will be sent to the President.[1] With TPA sent to the president and the House of Representatives passing TAA the second time around, the Obama Administration can chalk this round up as a victory.[2] Regardless of what happens next though, the fact that the President’s own party initially abandoned him leads to a much-needed discussion on the role trade agreements play in determining policy in a democratic society.