Political Report #1462 - Can an Article on Jair Bolsonaro be “Politically Neutral”?

by Steve Ellner 

LAP’s Political Report 1459 titled “The Washington Consensus Arrives in Brazil,” takes an uncritical look at Jair Bolsonaro and his policies. At first glance, the article appears to be neutral and the authors, Marc Castillo and Sírio Sapper, impartial analysts. Neither of these initial impressions are the case and indeed elsewhere both authors have defended the policies of the Bolsonaro government. A careful reading of Political Report 1459 reveals that the article, albeit for the most part subtly, justifies Bolsonaro’s policies and his presidency. At the same time, there is absolutely nothing in it that is at all critical of the Brazilian president. Below I provide quotes from the article which demonstrate the point I am making.

Latin American Perspectives correctly does not adhere to a specific political line or ideology, but we are nevertheless on the left. I also believe it is acceptable that we publish articles that fall outside of the left side of the political spectrum or ones that are politically neutral (if such a thing exists). At the same time, we have not over the years published articles that even remotely support the positions of the political right. 

“Political neutrality” may or may not exist for certain types of subject matter, but it certainly doesn’t exist for heavily charged issues like those related to the Bolsonaro government. To take a much more extreme example to help illustrate my point (but without the intention of casting aspersions on Castillo and Sapper in this regard), an article on Hitler that didn’t say anything good or bad about him could be interpreted as a justification of his actions. The same with an article on a mafia kingpin.

The following statements from the article may at first glance appear to be politically neutral, but in fact serve to enhance Bolsonaro’s highly questioned political legitimacy.

Here the authors point to the alleged success of the Bolsonaro in the fight against crime: 

"Brazil's population is exhausted from the high crime rate. Wanting to arrest the out- of-control crime rate Michel Temer´s administration was noticeably successful in containing crimes in general and specifically property crimes.”

“Bolsonaro’s election victory was partially related to public safety concerns.… Through his presidency Jair Bolsonaro has pushed forth many new initiatives to deal with the grave issue of security in Brazil.”

“All these measures were aimed to shore up public safety in the face of calamitous crime and insecurity that have been and continue to be prevalent in Brazil. Comparing year to year crime statistics published by the National Security Information System (Sinesp) from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security for the years 2019 and 2018 crime fell across the board with homicides experiencing a 20.3% decline, homicides involving robbery fell by 23.8% and robberies of financial institutions fell by 41.5% (March 17, 2021)…. Bolsonaro’s approval rating is largely attributed to Public Safety measures (Venagilia, 2019).”

The article also uncritically discusses the privatization that took place under Temer and has been reinforced by Bolsonaro: “Brazil´s complex political system has inhibited Paulo Guedes and his economic team from making the progress that some expected; nevertheless there has been pension reform, the recent autonomy of the Brazilian Central Bank and the Law of Economic Liberty.”

“The mere presence and continuation of Paulo Guedes in Bolsonaro´s cabinet portends vast credibility and political capital to ease investor worries."

The article then turns to Bolsonaro’s verbal aggression: “To popular media Bolsonaro´s presidency seems to be in a perpetual state of balance regarding his governance, however, there is no better even keel to the tumultuous president´s rhetoric than his agenda for free-market reform that serves to counter any notion of dictatorial perceptions.” The wording leaves the impression that his rhetoric is somewhat innocuous. No mention of Bolsonaro’s notoriously racist, misogynist, homophobic, and anti-immigrant statements.

The article ends on a positive note about Bolsonaro’s legacy: “A robust transformational process has taken hold in Brazil in terms of economic and financial progress with a distinct capitalist bent. Irrespective of who wins the presidency in 2022 the neoliberal economic groundwork has been laid and it is extremely doubtful that there will be any regression as the largest South American country attempts to become a more open and less protectionist.”

Bolsonaro can count on the commercial media to discuss his allegedly positive accomplishments. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal endorsed his presidential candidacy. Latin American Perspectives – as has always been our policy in other contexts – should refrain from publishing articles that fail to underline Bolsonaro’s criminal actions and behavior and those of his ilk. 

Blog Exclusive, Political Report #1959 - The Washington Consensus Arrives In Brasília

by Marc Castillo and Sírio Sapper

Abstract

John Williamson´s renown paper "The Washington Consensus" while causing controversy is nothing more than basic capitalist tenants.  Brazil has been undergoing a "Washington Consensus" transformation for decades now.  During the last several years this evolution has progressed at a more ambitious pace.  This paper examines the actions and mechanisms that the Bolsonaro administration has undertaken to make free market principles more concrete in Brazil.

Keywords:  Free Market Principles, Brazil Economy, Bolsonaro Administration, Brazil, Brazilian Politics

THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AND BRAZIL: CONTEXTUALIZATION

The ‘Washington Consensus’ has arrived in Brazil and it is there to stay.  In 1989, US Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady came out with a solution to the immediate debt crisis faced by countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Panama, and Peru among others at the time.  Shaped as a debt refinancing agreement, the initiative proposed extended terms between creditors and debtors under specific requirements to be fulfilled.  Though it is not thought of, several of the economic initiatives used by various Brazilian governments throughout the last several decades have heralded from the famous work of John Williamson called "A Short History Of The Washington Consensus, " these reforms haven given way to privatization and in a way more civil liberties, a Westernization or Americanization process is occurring in Brazil.  

To understand how Brazil got to this consensus it is imperative to comprehend the initial backdrop of the so-called "Washington Consensus."  One of the underlying precepts of the Washington Consensus is a process called "securitization,”  this process allowed debt to be exchanged for national government bonds, which were backed by U.S. bonds.  One of the main mechanisms of monetary stability adopted in Latin American economies during the late 1980s was the fixed exchange rate.  

In order for Brazil to adhere to the fixed exchange rate program, which it finally did in 1993, a series of reforms and compromises had to be undertaken.  In the spring of 1989, British economist John Williamson testified before a Congressional committee in favor of the Brady Plan, a plan where Latin American countries received credit from the United States to not default on debt (Williams  2004: 1).  He argued that it would be good policy to help the debtor countries overcome their debt burden, since Latin American countries were slightly shifting their economic practices (Williams, 2004: 1).  Those adjustments did not represent staunch radical Austrian laissez-faire changes, given that they were even advocated by mainstream economists such as Mário Simonsen and Béla Belassa (Williams, 2004: 1).

John Williamson writing in his acclaimed work, "A Short History Of The Washington Consensus," included social reforms as a means of enhanced social cohesion, opining on the merits of social stability which would in time be fundamental to the free market development process in Brazil.

Williamson´s infamous 1989 Washington Consensus paper highlights 10 points: (1) Fiscal discipline; (2) Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities; (3) Tax Reform; (4) Liberalizing Interest Rates; (5) A Competitive Exchange Rate; (6) Trade Liberalization; (7) Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment; (8) Privatization; (9) Deregulation; (10) Property Rights.
The term "Washington Consensus" became undoubtedly cliché and controversial. It belies the simple practicality of what it really is. Detractors and others who wish to criticize, enliven or even embellish the term fail to grasp that in reality it is just mainstream policy in developed nations.  They constitute well-established practices shared by wealthy and successful nations. 

The “Washington Consensus guidelines are only general principles, whose implementation can also vary from country to country.  The manner of which such directives are going to be carried out is still dependent on national factors and cultural norms: it is not an absolute standardized top-down solution applied indiscriminately.  Brazil in one way or another has been undergoing these reforms since the mid 1980s and now in the early 2020s the process of moving toward a free market directed society is more evolved and established.

Williamson´s points opposed the abolition of the market economy, which was tried in the communist countries for 70 years and proved a disastrous dead end, but to give the poor access to assets that will enable them to make and sell things that others will pay to buy. That means nation states need to develop and further four key paradigms to ensure success in a market-oriented economy: Education;  Titling programs;  Land reform;  Microcredit (Williams, 2004: 13).  These attributes of an open market economy are what Brazil has been developing and furthering during the Bolsonaro administration.  

ONGOING FREE MARKET REFORMS 

Federal Tax Reduction 

Tax reform is one of the most crucial aspects of free market liberalization.  The current Brazilian Tax Code dates from 1966, when the isolationist and ISI military dictatorship was in power. Little has happened regarding point three, which is tax reform,  of Williamson´s paper . There are different proposals, but no ultimate deadline for Congress to act on it.  Currently there are a few changes regarding federal taxation.  One such alteration on industrialised products (IPI) are no longer applied to roughly 300 different capital goods, among them are diesel engines, forklifts, crane machines, printer and biometric systems’ subparts.

There are four major transformations which already took place during the Bolsonaro administration: pension reform, central bank autonomy, economic freedom law and the new regulatory framework on basic sanitation. Each one is a case study in itself.  All these innovations are hallmarks of Williamson´s pragmatic approach.  The four measures cover nearly all of the 10 points in the Washington Consensus points paper. 

Normative Instruction 85/2020I

A very relevant initiative, but somewhat unnoticed, is the Normative Instruction 85/2020 from the National Department of Business Registration and Integration (DREI).  André Santa Cruz Ramos, a renowned professor and author, known as an avid Ayn Rand supporter, is in charge of the office.  This instruction promotes and cultivates deregulation.  To mention a few of these new changes: (1) associations or cooperatives can freely be converted into a business without any type of new registration; (2) there is no requirement for signature authentication or authenticated copy; (3) considerable extension of automatic business registration (Art. 43); (4) any business constitutive act registration is independent from any form of government authorization; (5) any business is permitted to extend the term for the payment of capital stock; (6) acts, documents and declarations that contain mere cadastral records (for example, changes in marital status, changes in addresses) do not require contractual alterations, being presented as a simple administrative measure.  These articles emphasize the swift pace at which deregulation has become a priority in Brazil as the country is moving toward being more business friendly. 

PRONAMPE

As stipulated, the Washington Consensus lays down social reforms as a means of neoliberal economic improvement.  One of them is microcredit access.  This subject matter is targeted by Law 13.999/20, which extended the term limits of the National Support Program for Micro and Small Enterprises (PRONAMPE).  Microcredit access lines have been extended by the Bolsonaro administration which provide small businesses the opportunity to continue to operate. 

The New Franchise Law 

The federal law nº 13.966/20 renews the franchise opportunities in Brazil.  Following in the steps of federal law nº 13.874/19 (Lei da Liberdade Econômica), the pacta sunt servanda principle shall be applied as the general rule among private contractors.  Unlike what has been done so far, any business contract now is taken primarily as a symmetric (Art. 421-A, Law of Economic Freedom). Thus, there can be no government intervention within the commerce sphere, until proven otherwise (Art. 421, § 4º, Law of Economic Freedom).

The prior franchise law was silent concerning the nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationships.  So the Brazilian Judiciary went back and forth on the idea of franchisor-franchisee bonds being protected by consumer rights.  That would represent a propitious environment for continuous government intervention, since consumer law presupposes an asymmetrical and uneven settlement.  With the renewed franchise law, the parties can freely express private autonomy regarding which contract clauses should be applied or not (Art. 1, Franchise Law/2020).

State companies and non-profit organizations are also able to sign franchise contracts (Art. 1, § 2º, Franchise Law/2020).  In order to be implemented, the franchisor must provide a Circular de Oferta de Franquia, similar to the American Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD) or Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (Art. 2).  This document must be handed over at least ten days before the contract signature (Art. 2, § 1º).  If the deadline is not duly fulfilled, the franchisee has the right to argue for a void or voidable contract (Art. 2, § 2º).  Under such circumstances, the franchisee holds the right to receive all its expenditures back (Art. 2, § 2º).

The parties may also elect an arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes related to the franchise agreement (Art. 7, Franchise Law/2020).  As seen, the arbitration clause is expressly guaranteed by the law.  This new law does not require the presence of any witness during the contract signature, unlike its predecessor.  This new law simplifies the franchise business on the whole, the franchisor-franchisee relationship and its practices.   

Rule of Law

As indicated previously, rule of law represents one of the main pillars of the “Washington Consensus.”  Rule of law is a basic institution that is also a pillar of Williamson´s work.  As rule of law is a basic pillar of functioning democracies it is unreasonable that the Washington Consensus point of private property guarantee should be characterized as "evil machinery."  According to John Williamson (Williams, 1990: 1):

"In the United States property rights are so well entrenched that their fundamental importance for the satisfactory operation of the capitalist system is easily overlooked. I suspect, however, that when Washington brings itself to think about the subject, there is general acceptance that property rights do indeed matter. There is also a general perception that property rights are highly insecure in Latin America."

As Williamson continued to elucidate regarding point 10 of his trademark piece: “This was primarily about providing the informal sector with the ability to gain property rights at acceptable cost (inspired by the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto’s analysis)” (Williams 2004: 4).  Brazil suffered from a drastic property crimes increase between the end of the 80’s until mid 2010’s.

Property rights are inextricably linked to public safety.  For several years, public safety was not viewed as a first tier subject matter.  Public safety was viewed as a consequence of inequality. Violence was perceived by the authorities as a result of economic inequality.  In order for Brazil to become a safer place, the income gap between the rich and the poor had to be reduced.  Naturally, this view was definitely not shared by the overwhelming majority of the population, rather by a fringe minority in power.  The reason is quite simple: traditionally Brazil is a High Gini coefficient economy. Reducing inequality in Brazil is an extremely complicated task (Brzezisnki 2012: 49-50). Therefore, waiting for this problem to be solved would take much time.  Brazil's population is exhausted from the high crime rate.  Wanting to arrest the out of control crime rate Michel Temer´s administration was noticeably successful in containing crimes in general and specifically property crimes.  

The Temer administration undertook several measures that included: (1) reactivated the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) and hand it out to Four-Star General Etchegoyen; (2) instituted the Single Public Security System (Sistema Único de Segurança Pública), the National Plan for Public Security and Social Defense (Plano Nacional para Segurança Pública e Defesa Social) and the National Council for Public Security and Social Defense (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Pública e Defesa Social); (3) authorized direct military intervention through the Law and Order Guarantee Operation (GLO) in Rio de Janeiro state and Roraima state; (4) increased security forces funding, by enabling private investment and by redirecting sports lottery resources; (5) the Federal Military Justice now holds military personnel responsible for intentionally violent crimes committed by military personnel against civilians within the GLO framework.  Michel Temer adhered to rule of law fundamentals that militarized public safety and laid the groundwork for Bolsonaro´s administration.  

Bolsonaro’s election victory was partially related to public safety concerns.  The mercurial Brazilian president has campaigned and continues to campaign on public safety as an ongoing concern.  Through his presidency Jari Bolsonaro has pushed forth many new initiatives to deal with the grave issue of security in Brazil.  Property crimes are still drastically in decline (Kadanus, 2020).  His actions included: (1) passing Anti-Crime Package legislation promoted by Ex-Minister of Justice Sérgio Moro; (2) transferring various criminal organization leaders to federal facilities; (3) apprehending drugs in record numbers; (4)  expreding the National Force towards many states; (5) creating the Secretary of Integrated Operations (Seop); (6) implementing the Portuguese-inspired program Em Frente Brasil, which select key-cities to receive special law enforcement treatment as role models; (7) authorizing military interventions through GLO operations in the Amazon region; (8) piling up intelligence and military agents throughout several government bodies; (9) extending the scope of action of the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI), the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) and the head of the Federal Police, compounding them; (10) facilitating private gun ownership.  

All these measures were aimed to shore up public safety in the face of calamitous crime and insecurity that have been and continue to be prevalent in Brazil.  Comparing year to year crime statistics published by the National Security Information System (Sinesp) from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security for the years 2019 and 2018 crime fell across the board with homicides experiencing a 20.3% decline, homicides involving robbery fell by 23.8% and robberies of financial institutions fell by 41.5% (March 17, 2021).  However, there is still improvement needed as homicide rates have climbed during the pandemic year of 2020 with an uptick of 7% in comparison to the first six months of 2019 (Kadanus, 2020).  Another attribute of public safety that coalesces with civil liberties and even manifests an air of "Americanization" is gun access policy, which the Bolsonaro administration is bolstering. Bolsonaro’s approval rating is largely attributed to Public Safety measures (Venagilia, 2019). 

Regarding to Moro’s Anti-Crime Package, it is fair to briefly point out some of the legal modifications introduced: (1) extending maximum jail time from 30 to 40 years; (2) making parole opportunities stricter; (3) instituting the plea bargain; (4) judicial supervision during criminal investigations. However, this extolled new criminal legislation is partially and temporarily suspended by a Supreme Court decision.  It is not clear exactly how this will come to fruition.  

PRIVATIZATION

In 1988 a group of international economists formed a “National Forum,” in Brazil whose aim was to point out “ideas for the modernization of Brazil.”  The forum was coordinated by João Paulo dos Reis Velloso, a former minister of the military regime and a close friend of Mário Simonsen.  Although it was not the central theme of the forum, privatization appeared strongly in Velloso's speech.  When discussing the “state conglomerates (Eletrobras, Petrobras, Telebras etc.)”, the former minister defended strict control of government spending, however, regarding other state-owned companies, Velloso defended the immediate sale of shares on stock exchanges.  For all his talk concerning privatization, Velloso pointed out areas that should not be sold that included electricity, oil, communication and transportation (Valente, 2013). Years later several of these industries would eventually go through privatization or go bankrupt. Between 1990 and 2015 privatizations resulted in over $100 billion in sales both at the federal and state level (Romero, 2021).

A Contemporary Privatizations 

Petrobrás follows the privatization example of state ownership where the state is a majority investor.  Through this style of state ownership the state accepts to follow certain rules to attract private investors as minority shareholders (Romero, 2021).  If Petrobrás were to be privatized, it would follow Embraer’s golden share clause model. That means the government holds a subsidiary veto power.  Even though these companies are private there is still a level of government influence and a minor opportunity for government intervention.  This level of government involvement in these companies also suffices as a possible vehicle for government exertion of foreign policy.  

On February 23, 2021 a provisional measure was brought to the Brazilian congress by the Minister of Mines and Energy Bento Albuquerque along with the Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes to start the process of privatizing Eletrobrás, the behemoth company of Brazilian Electricity.   This move has been anticipated by many as an inevitable part of the privatization process.  The government stake in Eletrobrás will drop from 61% to 45% and the government is expected to generate $11 billion through the share price rise.  Eletrobrás will likely follow Embraer´s privatization process and will adopt the golden share model.  

In a brazen effort to stave off any impression that he is not serious about economic liberalization, Bolsonaro submitted a proposal to congress to privatize the Brazilian postal service.  Whether the privatization is accomplished by direct sale, sale of majority control or sale of part of the company is yet to be determined (Miazzo, 2021).  The proposal for privatization of the Brazilian postal service mandates that the Empresas de Telégrafos e Correios continue to send mail throughout the country; private companies would not be obliged to deliver to the entire country.  Since there is no economic demand to establish mail service in remote places the government will continue to fulfill its public mandate.    

THE POLITICAL DIATRIBES OF THE BOLSONARO ADMINISTRATION

Despite the political frantics of Jair Bolsonaro there has been an underlying motion in his administration to privatize business and develop the private sector of the country which is perennially named "the country of the future." These reforms have taken place in Brazil at a time when perhaps few are noting the significance of it.  The political mayhem and polarization that has gripped Brazil distracts from some prominent yet slow developments in Brazilian economic liberalization.  

Bolsonaro´s rhetoric is mainly of his own doing firstly to rouse up populist sentiment and gain popularity as this is a staple of power perseverance in Brazil, secondly this sends mixed political signals that leaves opponents and pundits off-balance that can further agendas.  To popular media Bolsonaro´s presidency seems to be in a perpetual state of balance regarding his governance, however, there is no better even keel to the tumultuous president´s rhetoric than his agenda for free-market reform that serves to counter any notion of dictatorial perceptions.   

Brazil's government is attempting to greatly reduce the footprint of the state in the economy whether it be through asset sales, privatizations or  concessions across a range of sectors, all of which it hopes will attract foreign investment into the country (Ayers, 2019).  The fact that the Bolsonaro administration exceeded its 2019 target of $20 billion in divestiture is an accolade in itself.  The government of Brazil set a goal of privatizing state assets worth at least $20 billion and in the first nine months of 2019 it privatized $23.5 billion which the government tallied as revenue $19.25 billion (Ayers, 2019).  

The recent firing of the CEO of Petrobras is an example of the "interesting" character of Bolsonaro, while Bolsonaro does not share the same values as Venezuela's Chavez or Maduro there has been marked concern in the media.  The Brazilian president likely understands the maxim coined by LBJ "there is no such thing as bad press."  Where this recent demission has caused controversy this is merely a blip in the screen of his economic liberalization program that Paulo Guedes leads.  The firing of the CEO of Petrobras was quickly countered by the official start in the process of privatizing Eletrobras as well as the proposal to privatize the national mail service.  These rapid initiatives contrast with Bolsonaro´s recent decision involving Petrobras which demonstrates that after all the hype the Brazilian president is still keen on privatizing state-owned enterprises.  

Brazil´s complex political system has inhibited Paulo Guedes and his economic team from making the progress that some expected;  nevertheless there has been pension reform, the recent autonomy of the Brazilian Central Bank and the Law of Economic Liberty.  

The coronavirus pandemic has been costly to the free-market minded economy minister confiscating hope for fiscal rectitude that he hoped to push through (Pulice, 2020). Reforms on privatization have been slower than desired in 2020.  The mere presence and continuation of Paulo Guedes in Bolsonaro´s cabinet portends vast credibility and political capital to ease investor worries.  The Economist forecasts that even though GDP fell 4.4% in 2020, and is expected to recover in 2021 by growing 3.2% (Economist Intelligence Unit Report, 2021).

CONCLUSION

Irrespective of who wins the presidency in 2022 the neoliberal economic groundwork has been laid and it is extremely doubtful that there will be any regression as the largest South American country attempts to become a more open and less protectionist.  The ideas furthered by John Williamson´s work "The Washington Consensus" seems profoundly entrenched in Brazil and there are many reasons to think so. 

Plan Execution 

The historical implementation of Williamson´s points has a consistent past in Brazil.  At the end of the military regime, the liberalization process slowly took its first steps.  However, the acceleration only began with the Itamar Franco administration, through the Plano Real implementation, an important anchor for monetary stability.  In terms of privatizations, Embraer became a role model of how to proceed.  With the lessons of Embraer in mind FHC privatized Telebrás and Vale do Rio Doce and pushed through a Fiscal Responsibility Law.  The empowerment of Federal Agencies could be understood as another example of FHC´s commitment to the Washington Consensus paper, but it's praxis demonstrated to be more of a push-back than an effective accomplishment. 

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 

A robust transformational process has taken hold in Brazil in terms of economic and financial progress with a distinct capitalist bent.  Irrespective of who wins the presidency in 2022 the neoliberal economic groundwork has been laid and it is extremely doubtful that there will be any regression as the largest South American country attempts to become a more open and less protectionist. The ideas furthered by John Williamson´s work "The Washington Consensus" seems profoundly entrenched in Brazil and there are many reasons to think so. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ayres, Marcela and McGeever, Jamie. "Brazil Surpasses 2019 target of $20 billion in privatizations." Reuters.  October 3, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-economy-privatization-idUKKBN1WI2HY

Bronzatto, Thiago.  “Luiz Eduardo Ramos: É ultrajante dizer que o Exército vai dar golpe.” Veja. June 12, 2020. https://veja.abril.com.br/paginas-amarelas/luiz-eduardo-ramos-e-ultrajante-dizer-que-o-exercito-vai-dar-golpe/

Brzezisnki, Zbigniew. Part 2: The Warning of the American Dream. In: Strategic Vision. Basic books, 2012 (New York)

Cavalcanti, Leonardo.  “8.450 militares da reserva trabalham em ministérios, comandos e tribunais.” Poder 360. July 17, 2020.https://www.poder360.com.br/brasil/8-450-militares-da-reserva-trabalham-em-ministerios-comandos-e-tribunais/

Genro, Tarso.  “O culpado da mortandade não é o Exército. É Bolsonaro e seus políticos liberais e fascistas.” Sul 21. January 21, 2021. https://www.sul21.com.br/colunas/tarso-genro/2021/01/o-culpado-da-mortandade-nao-e-o-exercito-e-bolsonaro-e-seus-politicos-liberais-e-fascistas/

Maretti, Eduardo.  “Para Celso Amorim, Forças Armadas tendem a não apoiar um golpe.” RBA. June 05, 2020. https://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/politica/2020/06/para-celso-amorim-forcas-armadas-tendem-a-nao-apoiar-um-golpe/

Miazzo, Leonardo.  "Bolsonaro leva ao Congresso projeto que abre caminho para privatizar os Correios.” Carta Capital.  February 24, 2021. https://www.cartacapital.com.br/economia/bolsonaro-leva-ao-congresso-projeto-que-abre-caminho-para-privatizar-os-correios/

Pinheiro, Armando Castelar. 2011. “Two Decades of Privatization in Brazil.” In The Economies of Argentina and Brazil: A Comparative Perspective, edited by Werner Baer and David  Fleischer, 252–78. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Pulice, Carolina.  Paulo Guedes’ star fades as Brazil reform agenda stalls. Financial Times. December 22, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/34e7b7ea-dd69-4665-a4eb-5a42a374d7f0

Ricz, Judith.  "Strong State Influence in the Brazilian Economy: Continuity or Change?" In Seeking the Best Master, ed. Miklós Szanyi. Central European University Press 2019, Budapest-New York: Central European University Press, 2019.

Romero, Cristiano.  "Privatizações geraram US $150 billion em 30 anos." Valor Econômico.  February 17, 2021. https://valor.globo.com/brasil/coluna/privatizacoes-geraram-us-150-bi-em-30-anos.ghtml

Segurança.  "País registra queda de 20.3% nos homicídios." March 17, 2020. Accessed Feb. 13, 2021. www.gov.br

The Economist Intelligence Unit. "EIU Country Report Brazil." Accessed February 23, 2021. http://country.eiu.com/Brazil.

Venaglia, Guilherme. Segurança pública é a área do governo Bolsonaro com maior aprovação.  Veja. April 24, 2019. https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/com-57-seguranca-publica-e-a-area-mais-aprovada-do-governo-bolsonaro/

Williamson, John. A Short History on the Washington Consensus. In Conference “From the Washington Consensus towards a new Global Governance”, Fundación CIDOB, Barcelona, September 24–25, 2004.

Willianson, John. Chapter 2: What Washington Means by Policy Reform. In Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?. Institute of International Economics. Washington, D.C., April 1990.

About the Authors:

Marc Castillo is a Master in Latin American International Affairs from The George Washington University in Washington D.C.  Marc has written several articles related to Brazil and the Mercosul region.  He has lived, worked, traveled, and studied in Latin America.  Marc is a federal civil servant and a consultant. 

 

Sírio Sapper is a graduate of the Federal University of Rio Grande Do Sul in Porto Alegre, Brazil.  He is a lawyer who focuses on military law as well as general law.  He has written several articles related to Brazil and the Mercosul region. Sirio is an alumni from  Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen in Germany.  He practices law in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

The Trump of the Tropics Virus

By Cliff Welch, São Paulo, Brazil 20/04/2020

With the Covid-19 pandemic, most days’ news reminds me of Marx’s phrase about history repeating itself, first as tragedy, second as farce. As I regularly consume news about the United States, the tragedy plays out daily in the magnitude of the disease’s spread, the runaway death count and the ineffective, egocentric responses of President Donald Trump. In contrast, news about governors like New York’s Andrew Cuomo and California’s Gavin Newsom, stimulate hope. But, here in Brazil, hope is presented as a horizon sublimely blind to facts learned the hard way in globe’s far flung corners. President Jair Bolsonaro tells people to go back to work. He characterizes Covid-19 as a “little flu” and spectacularly defies prohibitions on social isolation and distancing. On April 19, he addressed a rally in front of the Brazilian Army headquarters in Brazil’s capital city. Defying social distancing guidelines, Bolsonaro’s supporters called on the Army to intervene by shutting down the congress and supreme court. “We don’t want to negotiate anything,” Bolsonaro told the crowd. “Count on your president…to guarantee…our freedom.” Two days earlier, he fired his health minister for advocating policies established by the World Health Organization (WHO). On many occasions, Bolsonaro’s stance has aped that of Trump’s. It would be farcical, if the potential consequences were not so terribly tragic.

In the 20^th century, U.S. foreign policy sought to demonstrate to the world the benefits of the “American Way of Life.” In the 21^st century, Trump has bragged about the greatness of the U.S. model in dealing with the novel coronavirus, even though the country is overwhelmed by the highest number of infections and deaths in the world. Fortunately, few countries seem to take Trump seriously; unfortunately, Brazil is not one of them.

So far, the impact of the disease on Brazil, has been milder than that experienced by many northern hemisphere countries. Studies are underway to determine if warmer weather impedes the spread of the virus. But Winter is only weeks away and the capital of São Paulo state has already experienced unseasonably low temperatures. Some 24 million people live in or around this megacity. Well within the tropics, Brazil ranks as Latin America’s most affected country, with thousands more cases confirmed and death rate over 5 percent in São Paulo. Like New York in the U.S., São Paulo is responsible for more than a third of Brazil’s cases and deaths. The state’s governor, João Doria, like the leaders of a few other populous states, has ignored Bolsonaro and maintained social isolation policies, including the imposition of school and commerce closings and stay at home guidelines since mid-March. Unfortunately, only 37 percent of the population is estimated to abide by these norms, according to a study conducted in April. Bolsonaro and his supporters want to be free of these sorts of rules, rules that arguably have origins in international organizations rather than national ones.

Mixed messages about best practices and the politicization of the disease in Brazil have created an alarming situation for dealing with the pandemic. As Bolsonaro spends his Sundays physically embracing supporters and encouraging them to mount car and truck-honking caravans of protest against local officials like Doria, uncounted victims of Covid-19 die daily in nearly every city of Brazil. In just over a month, the number of official victims has quickly grown from one to more than 200 a day. But, The Intercept recently released emails communication between São Paulo officials who were anxiously seeking a means to reduce the count. One way was by testing as few cases as possible; another suggested sending the sick home from emergency rooms to die. In mid-April, officially there were more than 39,000 infected people and nearly 2,500 Covid-19 deaths. Considering reports of extraordinary numbers of illnesses and deaths related to respiratory problems, these statistics should probably be double.

Most deaths occur in peripheral neighborhood, where the poor are concentrated. While race and poverty are closely correlated in the U.S., studies in Brazil suggest that social class is a more telling factor. On the margins of São Paulo, far away from many public services, sick black, white and brown people have been turned away from local clinics, told to go home, where a lack of space, soap, food and information serve only the virus, which anxiously seeks to reproduce itself. In these communities, women between the ages of 30 and 50 – mothers in many cases – have been the disease’s most fertile field, as they are the most numerous among those infected by Covid-19.

The false economy of turning away sick people has been used to prevent an extreme overload on the resources of the public health system, a public health system crippled by years of neoliberal austerity measures, including a 2017 constitutional amendment that reduced annual expenditures on public health to the equivalent of $5.20 per capita. While in the U.S., the number of ventilators is debated with urgency, in Brazil the debate is focused on respirators, a designation that includes protective masks like the N-95 and mechanical respirators. At the end of March, reports estimated the number of ventilators in Brazil at 46,000. That’s far fewer than some U.S. states have, and Brazil is larger than the continental U.S. and has two-thirds its population.

While Brazil’s mainstream media display middle-class mothers struggling to make the best use their time cloistered at home, tending their home office, health and children’s education, women on the periphery are caught in a daily struggle for survival. When schools were closed in mid-March, working class families lost essential supplemental help in the form of mandatory school breakfasts, lunches and dinners. São Paulo schools on the periphery have been sequestered by the public health system, some for beds, others to serve as cafeterias for health care personnel. Children at home also make it difficult for women to work outside the home, as many do, cleaning middle class condominiums. Social isolation policies also shut them out of these sources of income.

A few weeks ago, following similar actions by the U.S. government, Brazil’s congress made a gesture at emergency payouts to workers. Given certain criteria, each unemployed worker was allotted the equivalent of $120 a month for three months. But accepting these funds also meant giving up another source of income, the “family grants” of about $20 a month. In an attempt at compensation, São Paulo loaded a family benefit card with an additional $10 per month. São Paulo food prices are equivalent to those found in discount U.S. grocery stores. Thus, these families, though sick, must turn to the streets to make money in the informal economy and search for food in the waste bins of the better off. At the start of April, more than half of Brazil’s adult population left some of their March bills unpaid.

As Noam Chomsky has observed, Trump’s inconsistency is an agile strategy intended to shield him from criticism. Bolsonaro looks to Trump for orders, like he turned to generals for direction as an army captain. But he was an insubordinate captain, selectively following orders until forced out. So, he salutes Trumpisms he likes. In February, Trump stated that the “cure couldn’t be worse than the disease,” saying that coronavirus was no worse than the annual flu. Later, Trump argued that Covid-19 was being used by his enemies to undermine his government. He re-tweeted deep-stater messages aimed at removing the much respected epidemiologist Dr. Anthony Fauci, due to his subtle corrections of Trump’s enthusiasms, such as the scientifically unfounded curative properties of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine.

With a Brazilian twist, Bolsonaro imitated these trumpisms. He latched onto the line about the cure not being worse than the problem like a mantra. With a surgical mask hanging from his left ear, he recommended “vertical isolation” in order to get the economy going. Vertical, as opposed to horizontal isolation means socially isolating the most vulnerable groups, like the elderly, while everyone else operates normally. Based on WHO analysis, his so-to-be-fired health minister rejected the notion. Bolsonaro copied his U.S. counterpart again in trumpeting the chloroquine drugs as therapeutic for curing Covid-19. This time, the health minister did not stand in the way. Fortunately, Brazilian doctors decided to test of the drugs’ effectiveness and contributed one more study demonstrating that the malaria drugs cause more problems than they cure.

Like Trump, Bolsonaro has suggested that Covid-19 is part of plots designed to undermine his government’s efforts to revive an economy that was already on life-support. Along with threes of his sons, who are also politicians, the Bolsonaro clan – like the Trump-Kushner clan - has also put forward an argument that China is behind the pandemic. In a Great Power rivalry with the U.S. and its allies, the theory states, China infected Brazil and the U.S. in order to weaken Western Civilization. It does not seem to matter that China was the disease’s first victim, that the Chinese quickly released to the world the novel coronavirus genetic code or that a traveler from Italy brought Brazil its first Covid-19 infections.

The only time that Bolsonaro placed human life above the economy came at the end of March, just three days after Trump, shocked by modelling that showed U.S. death rates climbing to more than 100,000 people, extended social distancing guidelines by a month. Shortly thereafter, of course, Trump became impatient with his own guidelines. In the meantime, Bolsonaro continued to do almost everything possible to sabotage mitigation efforts. Much was made of a Central Bank report that emphasized projections of how the economic curve of recession only worsened with more effective mitigation efforts. In other words, as wellness improves, the economy sickens. Shortly thereafter, Bolsonaro fired his health minister, replacing him with someone who appeared ready to march in step with the president and undermine Brazil’s efforts to adhere to the WHO strategy. Here, again, farce followed tragedy.

In the race to return to normalcy, it is difficult to say which of these authoritarian populists is the copycat. Bolsonaro has been physically courting his followers consistently, whereas Trump has merely tweeted. In mid-March, confused by social distancing concerns, Bolsonaro called off national rallies planned to intimidate congress, but some of his fans defied his orders. Since then, his supporters have hosted caravans in luxury cars and pickup trucks. Supporters among evangelicals have also held regular Sunday services (while Catholic priests have faithfully practiced social distancing guidelines by performing mass over Facebook). Now we see Trump stimulating caravans, rallies and other actions by his supporters to “liberate” the nation from mitigation strategies designed to slow the spread of Covid-19. The “liberation” concept appeared of few days later in Bolsonaro’s speech to the pró-dictatorship rally in Brasília. Whoever gets the credit for defying public health advisories, both should be held responsible for the unecessary illness and death that will surely follow. They are the virus.

Marx interpreted as tragic the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte and as farce the rise of Luis Bonaparte. I see tragedy in Trump’s performance, as his ego-centric response to warnings about Covid-19 caused him to ignore and downplay the threat, permitting the rampant spread of the virus in the country. Bolsonaro’s infatuation with Trump and all things “American” make a parody of his actions. By imitating Trump’s ineffectual responses in a country with so few resources to deal with the pandemic, Bolsonaro has created an extremely dangerous situation for the entire population. Where the incredible resources of the U.S. have allowed Trump to partially compensate for his foibles by spending trillions of dollars, Bolsonaro’s ignorant response has left Brazil disarmed in the face of rapacious virus. Feeding the frenzied demands of a middle class tired of cleaning its own toilets, Bolsonaro has taken decisions that may already have condemned the country to tragic ends. Let’s hope history proves me wrong.

Political Report # 1441 'Project of death': alarm at Bolsonaro's plan for Amazon-spanning bridge by  Dom Phillips, The Guardian

Residents of riverside communities in the state of Pará are unconvinced by the Bolsonaro government’s claims of jobs and other benefits that a dramatic extension of a trans-Amazon highway would bring. From the veranda of her wooden home, Joaci da Silva looked out across her garden towards the waters of the River Amazon, and shuddered as she considered the future. “Today we live in a paradise,” she said. But the future of that paradise is in doubt after Brazil’s far-right president Jair Bolsonaro backed plans to build a bridge across the river, and extend a busy highway hundreds of miles through protected forests. “We know there will be a big impact,” said Da Silva, 51, who – like many people in the tiny riverside community of Santíssima Trindade – fears the project will bring crime, noise and pollution. “It will bring some benefits and jobs, but there will be devastation.” A short boat ride away from her home is the quaint colonial backwater of Óbidos; beyond that is 500km of rainforest stretching to Suriname – the “Calha Norte”, or “North Zone” of Pará state. Military officers in the government say the region should be settled and developed, as happened in other parts of the Amazon during Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-1985), a period revered by Bolsonaro. Along with economic benefits, they argue that populating the Calha Norte could also help defend Brazilian territory – even raising the spectre of a supposed threat posed by Chinese migrants in Suriname. Advertisement The plan – known as the Baron Rio Branco programme – revises an elaborate infrastructure scheme first proposed in 1953 which includes constructing a major hydroelectric plant, building a bridge across this narrow stretch of the Amazon and extending a major highway all the way to the Suriname border. The US government briefly offered support to the some of the plans through an Amazon “megaprojects” scheme run by a private contractor for its development agency, USAid, but that programme was shut down in December under pressure from indigenous organisations and environmental groups. Bolsonaro and his ministers say that the Amazon’s 23 million people want development and argue that reducing poverty will combat rising deforestation. But environmentalists, indigenous leaders and riverside dwellers like Joaci da Silva are deeply dismayed by the project. Three-quarters of Pará’s North Zone consists of protected areas and indigenous reserves. Environmentalists say building a highway will open the region up to loggers, wildcat miners and land-grabbers, as happened further south in the Amazon where the same highway – the BR-163 – borders one of the most devastated conservation areas in Brazil, the Jamanxim forest. The BR-163 connects the agricultural powerhouse state of Mato Grosso to the Amazon ports Miritituba and Santarém, and in November the army finished asphalting its last unpaved section. The plan includes two alternative routes to link the road to the proposed bridge at Óbidos and points north. Forest peoples see the highway as a threat. “It will bring land invasions and looting of minerals and wood,” said Juventino Kaxuyana, a leader from the remote Kaxuyana-Tunayana indigenous reserve – home to voluntarily isolated indigenous groups – which the highway will cross. “The Amazon is asking for help,” said Ivanildo de Souza, president of Cachoeira Porteira, a settlement founded by descendants of enslaved people which is threatened by a hydroelectric plant included in the plan. Bolsonaro’s government started working on the Baron Rio Branco programme after he took office in January 2019. Maynard Santa Rosa, an army general put in charge of the scheme, said that the government was working to integrate the North Zone – adding that the area was “still a desert”. Santa Rosa has since resigned – but not before arguing at a meeting in the state capital, Belém, last April that the programme would protect the country from a putative invasion of Chinese migrants in Suriname. There are currently 14,000 Chinese in Suriname, 2% of its population of 583,000. Brazil’s population is around 210 million. Details of the meeting were first published by The Intercept and Open Democracy. On a recent morning, some in Óbidos were enthusiastic about the plans. Most local people live from fishing, work for city hall or in two Brazil nut processing plants. “It would improve things for the town,” said Jean Reis, 45, slicing jagged rows of fins off the black cujuba fish he was selling on the waterfront. At the dusty town museum, Regina Figueira, 56, said she hoped the bridge might revive prosperous times, when the town was an important port. “People had more purchasing power,” she said. In August a group of military officers came to Óbidos to promote the scheme. They told the mayor, Francisco Alfaia, that populating areas around the highway would protect the North Zone from being “colonised” by foreign NGOs. The argument failed to convince him. “They haven’t explained it very well,” Alfaia said. “I don’t see what benefits it would bring us.” Alfaia’s doubts were fed by his own experience in another Amazon region battered by an ambitious development project. He previously worked as a bank manager in Altamira, the Pará town whose population almost doubled after the mammoth Belo Monte hydroelectric plant was built nearby. Riverside communities were flooded and residents now live in crime-ridden, urban slums. The murder rate soared by over 1,000%. “We’re going to turn our town into a bunch of favelas while prostitution and robberies grow,” Alfaia said. The officers also visited Nélio Aguiar, mayor of the nearby port of Santarém, who was similarly skeptical of the plan which includes the construction of several hydroelectric plants. “Brazil can’t be hostage to this energy model,” Aguiar said, arguing for more sustainable energy sources. When approached for comment, the Brazilian government’s strategic affairs department pointed to a statement on its website. “The Baron Rio Branco programme is still under discussion,” it said. “The expectation is that a development cluster would be made possible, by increasing the presence of state institutions in the region.” Environmentalist groups and indigenous leaders have repeatedly raised the alarm over the programme. The Brazilian Indigenous People’s Articulation called it an “atrocity” that contravened indigenous rights enshrined in Brazil’s 1988 constitution. Auricélia Arapiun, 32, a law student and indigenous leader in Santarém, said that rather than developing the region, the government’s plans would “make the Amazon a desert”. “This is a project of death,” she said. Original article can be found (here). URL:      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/mar/10/brazil-amazon-bridge-project-bolsonaro