Political Report # 1443 Will a Failed Plot in Venezuela Strengthen Maduro?

Political Report # 1443 Will a Failed Plot in Venezuela Strengthen Maduro? a Q&A, Latin America Advisor

Q: Venezuelan forces killed eight people and arrested several others—including two former U.S. Green Berets—in a failed attempt earlier this month to infiltrate the South American country by sea. Another former U.S. Green Beret purportedly masterminded the attack, which its organizers code named “Operation Gideon,” while Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó and U.S. President Donald Trump denied involvement. How will the incident affect support for Maduro and for Guaidó? How likely is the failed incursion to lead to Venezuelan government crackdowns on Maduro’s opponents? How does it affect the Venezuelan opposition’s efforts to unseat Maduro? A: Peter Hakim, member of the Advisor board and president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue: “Juan Guaidó and his allies have suffered another sharp blow in their struggle to wrest control of the Venezuelan government. But this, by no means, should be viewed as the opposition’s last battle. Although ‘Operation Gideon’ was quickly stopped in its tracks, the Maduro regime remains feeble and unpopular. Indeed, it hardly governs at all. Mostly, it is just cruelly holding on to power. With the economy already devastated and hunger and malnutrition widespread, Covid-19 has made life even more hellish for Venezuelans. But the opposition forces are badly fractured. Without a unified plan of action, a minimal strategy or a clear set of priorities, they appear simply to be pursuing whatever opportunities come their way. Sometimes they succeed, for example, when Guaidó was praised by Trump and applauded by the entire U.S. Congress during the State of the Union—a clear diplomatic victory but without consequential follow-up. Failures have been more frequent, each leaving Maduro a bit stronger, while the opposition appears weaker and more disorganized. After the Gideon episode, the countries that recognize Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader have reason to be concerned about his judgment and leadership. What comes next? Probably more of the same, unless the United States unexpectedly revises its Venezuela policy, which today is fixated on ousting Maduro, using tactics that have left an impoverished population worse off. The opposition too, needs to change course, to demonstrate greater realism and patience. It needs to develop its own strategy and not depend on the United States for direction and initiative. The United States has little interest in Venezuela, aside from showing off its power and winning votes in Florida. The opposition needs to shift focus from quickly getting rid of Maduro to building a more unified, more potent political movement.” A: Steve Ellner, associate managing editor of Latin American Perspectives and retired professor of the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela: “Every aspect of the recent attempt to topple the Maduro government points to Juan Guaidó’s lack of leadership capacity. The incident cuts into his support among both the radical opposition that backs the use of force and the majority of Venezuelans, who, according to polls, favor concrete proposals to solve pressing immediate problems over regime-change strategies. In the first place, Guaidó’s signature on the contract with the Florida-based Silvercorp USA disregards the history of operations of this sort, in which planners go to length to ensure the credibility of a Plan B consisting of denial of involvement in case of failure. In the second place, Guaidó’s commitment of $213 million to Silvercorp raises questions about the origins of such a large sum of money. In the third place, even those favoring a military solution are criticizing the use of foreign mercenaries. In the fourth place, the plan envisioned one of two scenarios, one naïve and the other questionable on ethical grounds. The choice of Macuto, with a strong navy presence nearby, for landing implied that the Venezuelan armed forces would spontaneously turn against Maduro, contrary to its behavior throughout 2019. The contract implied a possible drawn-out bloody confrontation with specified human targets including those close to Maduro and Diosdado Cabello. The Los Angeles Times reported that the incident has ‘buoyed’ Maduro. During his rule, Chávez counted on the backing of a sizable majority of voters. It is unlikely that most of them would support an opposition that incident after incident becomes branded ’Made in the USA.’ Some of this sentiment gets translated into support for Maduro, even among Venezuelans who fervently oppose his policies.” A: Charles Shapiro, president of the World Affairs Council of Atlanta and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela: “In Season 2 of ‘Jack Ryan,’ six Americans on a boat set in motion events that bring down the ruthless Venezuelan dictator. While entertaining, ‘Jack Ryan’ is fiction. Nonetheless, the perpetrators of this incident appear to have used a TV script as their plan to depose Maduro. The reality is that Venezuela is a huge country, the military is thus far loyal to Maduro and Cuban intelligence is very good. The 2002 ‘coup’ against Chávez weakened the opposition for a decade while Chávez entrenched a system that destroyed the nation’s economy and the remaining vestiges of its democratic institutions. It should not surprise anyone that Maduro, who proclaimed himself Chávez’s ‘hijo político’ is trying to use this goofy incident to maintain himself in Miraflores while the country is ravaged by Covid-19, the economy requires last rites, oil production at 622,000 barrels per day has dropped to 1944 levels and oil prices have cratered. Maduro should be panicking. Instead, this incident has given him a lifeline while increasing the centrifugal force pulling at the fractious opposition coalition. What is bad for Guaidó is good for Maduro. Net result: this incident was an own goal. As for the fictional Venezuela of ‘Jack Ryan,’ President Nicolás Reyes is not nearly as ruthless or as corrupt as Maduro, the fictional economy is not nearly as bad as the real Venezuelan economy and the fictional military hesitates to shoot Venezuelan citizens while the real security forces have no compunction about repressing their countrymen.” A: David Smilde, senior fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America and professor of sociology at Tulane University: “It is important to remember that in the past three years since the Maduro government moved from electoral authoritarianism to hegemonic authoritarianism, the opposition has tried street mobilization, going to elections, international pressure and negotiations, all without results. Thus, this type of desperate measure should not surprise. Most damaging is Juan Guaidó’s failure to assume responsibility and clearly pivot to trace out a new strategy. This has produced a malaise within Venezuela and cast a shadow on his leadership among international allies. The opposition is hopelessly divided between those who think a strategy based on political mobilization and negotiation is the way forward and those who think that is naïve and just postpones foreign military intervention. Behind this, of course, is the Trump administration’s frequent statements that ‘all options are on the table.’ Few people close to the U.S. government think there actually is a military option, but it has captured the imagination of wide swaths of Venezuelans in the country and in the diaspora. Combined with a population being ground down by a humanitarian crisis exacerbated by U.S. sanctions, there is little chance the opposition will be able to mount a real political challenge to the Maduro government. At this point, the only way the current tragic equilibrium could be altered would be a change in the geopolitical interests and pressures at play. A negotiation between the United States and Russia, designation of a special representative by the United Nations or robust engagement by the European Union could reorganize the conflict.” A: Maria Velez de Berliner, managing director of RTG-Red Team Group, Inc.: “Covert actions to execute regime change are the task and responsibility of professional operatives, not of civilian amateurs such as the incompetent mercenaries of ‘Operation Gideon.’ As Sean McFate’s work demonstrates, ‘mercenaries are the future of war.’ But those mercenaries require training, reliable equipment, tactical support and must have proven ability to carry out their mission; and whoever sponsors them must have credible, plausible deniability. None of these conditions existed in ‘Operation Gideon.’ Few believe the United States and Guaidó had no previous knowledge of the action. Its failure resulted in a risible fiasco that narrowed the range of options of the United States and gave Maduro a public relations coup. With its support of ‘Operation Gideon,’ Venezuela’s opposition, led by Guaidó, demonstrated it is ill advised, naïve and woefully ignorant of the deleterious repercussions that failed actions such as ‘Operation Gideon’ have. It also shows the miscalculation of the United States regarding Maduro’s support. To execute regime change in Venezuela, the United States will need to: 1.) negotiate with Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino, because deposing Maduro must have the army’s support; 2.) know what to do with Venezuela’s colectivos, militias, guerrillas and sundry nonstate criminal actors; 3.) know the pros and cons of whoever takes power, from the Venezuelans’ perspective; and 4.) do all this professionally and, hopefully legally, not through amateurish, wishful actions such as ‘Operation Gideon.’ ” Original article can be found (here). URL:      https://venezuelablog.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/LAA200519.pdf

Exclusive, New York Times Hails Nicolas Maduro’s Economic Pragmatism by Steve Ellner, LAP Editor

New York Times Hails Nicolas Maduro’s Economic Pragmatism commentary written by Steve Ellner The New York Times on February 8 published an article titled “To Survive, Venezuela’s Leader Gives Up Decades of Control Over Oil.” This is the second article in two weeks to describe Nicolás Maduro’s pragmatic economic policies which includes privatization and an opening up to foreign capital in the oil industry. The articles attribute the recent modest pickup of the Venezuelan economy to these pragmatic policies and are quick to point out that they go counter to Hugo Chávez’s strategy of asserting greater state control of the economy in the name of achieving socialism by gradual means. Actually, the articles aren’t bad, if you compare them with the coverage of the rest of the commercial media (including the New York Times in general) on Venezuela. But the authors fail to connect the dots. They talk about how Washington’s secondary boycott has made it difficult for Venezuela’s PDVSA to enter into commercial relations with intermediaries (insurance companies, shipping companies, etc.) to export crude and then they wonder why Maduro is privatizing exports. They also talk about Trump’s special permission to Chevron and 4 oil service companies (Halliburton, Baker Hughes, Schlumberger and Weatherfield) without pointing to the obvious favoritism toward U.S. capital in the name of fighting for democracy. In fact, it is a throwback to the inter-imperialist rivalry of the pre-World War I era given the fact that these are U.S. companies (Schlumberger is half U.S.) and that Washington is closing the doors on companies (such as the Spain’s Repsol) which are being threatened with a secondary boycott. There is opposition to Maduro’s pragmatism from within the pro-government Chavista movement (as opposed to those leftists such as Marea Socialista who make no distinction between Maduro and Juan Guaidó). This dissidence is heavily represented in the Chavista peasant movement that has opposed the privatization of state land (such as rice production) and has received backing from one of the top Chavista historical leaders, Elias Jaua. In this conflict between Maduro’s pragmatism and Madurista critics on the left, there may not be any “correct” answer as to who is correct. This conflict may be a manifestation of the “creative tensions” that Alvaro Garcia Linera alludes to in reference to the popular protests in Bolivia under Evo Morales or Mao’s “contradictions among the people.” A comparison may also be made with Lenin’s New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union in the 20s that gave rise to the Kulak class, which ended up resisting socialism. Thus a “correct” strategy at a given moment may lead to undesirable consequences. In any case, these developments have to be understood in the context of a crippling economic, political and cultural war on Venezuela led from Washington, which has limited the options for the Chavista government. New York Times' article: To Survive, Venezuela’s Leader Gives Up Decades of Control Over Oil By Anatoly Kurmanaev and Clifford Krauss Faced with a severe economic crisis, the country’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, is letting foreign firms take over daily operations of its oil fields. It’s a break with core tenets of his socialist revolution. CARACAS, Venezuela - After decades of dominating its oil industry, the Venezuelan government is quietly surrendering control to foreign companies in a desperate bid to keep the economy afloat and hold on to power. The opening is a startling reversal for Venezuela, breaking decades of state command over its crude reserves, the world’s biggest. The government’s power and legitimacy have always rested on its ability to control its oil fields - the backbone of the country’s economy - and use their profits for the benefit of its people. But the nation’s authoritarian leader, Nicolás Maduro, in his struggle to retain his grip over a country in its seventh year of a crippling economic crisis, is giving up policies that once were central to its socialist-inspired revolution. Under Venezuelan law, the state-run oil company must be the principal stakeholder in all major oil projects. But as that company, Petróleos de Venezuela, or Pdvsa, unravels - under the weight of American sanctions, years of gross mismanagement and corruption - the work is unofficially being picked up by its foreign partners. Private companies are pumping crude, arranging exports, paying workers, buying equipment and even hiring security squads to protect their operations in a collapsing countryside, according to managers and oil consultants working on the country’s energy projects. In effect, a stealth privatization is taking place, said Rafael Ramírez, who ran Venezuela’s oil industry for more than a decade before breaking with Mr. Maduro in 2017, in a video address this week. “Today, Pdvsa doesn’t manage our oil industry, Venezuelans don’t manage it,” said Mr. Ramírez. “In the middle of the chaos generated by the worst economic crisis suffered by the country in its history, Maduro is taking actions to cede, transfer and hand over oil operations to private capital.” Pdvsa did not respond to requests for comment on its recent concessions to private partners. The haphazard changes to the oil sector, which have accelerated in recent months, are remaking the oil industry in a nation whose assertive energy policies had, since the 1950s, served as an example to developing countries of how to take control of natural resources. And they are a stark retreat from the vision of Hugo Chávez, who was Mr. Maduro’s mentor and predecessor. Mr. Chávez nationalized in 2007 the giant holdings of Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips and packed Pdvsa’s leadership ranks with political allies dedicated to his socialist-inspired “Bolivarian revolution.” But Mr. Maduro’s transformation of Venezuela’s oil industry has stemmed the collapse triggered by an American embargo. Sanctions imposed in January 2019 had wiped out about a third of Venezuela’s oil production, bringing it down at one point to the lowest level since the 1940s, according to data from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Oil production now is still less than a third of the total in 1998, when Mr. Chávez took power. By late 2019, Venezuela had stabilized exports at about a million barrels per day, according to Bloomberg’s tanker tracking data. The dribble of oil exports has provided Mr. Maduro with foreign revenue at the most critical moment of the country’s economic crisis, allowing him to adjust to sanctions and consolidate his rule. In the country’s main oil export hub, José, key processing plants and piers are slowly coming to life after near total paralysis in the summer, when Pdvsa was cut off from the global financial system and struggling to cope without its biggest market, the United States, according to shipping agents and oil managers. The unofficial, partial privatizations of the past year have been led by an unlikely reformer: Manuel Quevedo, a National Guard general with no known oil experience who was appointed by Mr. Maduro to head Pdvsa. General Quevedo broke with the nationalist rhetoric of his predecessors to hand over operational control of joint oil projects to partners that include Chevron, Russia’s state-run company, Rosneft, some European and Chinese companies and groups of Venezuelan magnates. “With Pdvsa in crisis mode, they are increasingly handing operational responsibilities and decisions over to the partners,” said Lisa Viscidi, a specialist in Latin American energy issues at Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based research group. The concessions are gradually reducing Pdvsa to little more than a holding company collecting the state’s share of oil field revenues, with most of financial and strategic decisions taken by private partners. This is a startling decline from just a decade ago, when Pdvsa was the pride of Venezuela and the cornerstone of its economy. Until the start of the economic crisis in 2013, the company was the source of virtually all of Venezuela’s hard currency. It was also its biggest employer and penetrated all aspects of life in the country, running everything from supermarkets to parks. Today, oil fields wholly owned by Pdvsa account for less than half of the nation’s remaining oil production, and their output continues to plummet. Chevron has become the single largest foreign producer of oil in Venezuela, and a crucial part of the country’s stabilization over the past few months. Its four joint ventures in the country are pumping a gross total of about 160,000 barrels per day, according to two industry sources familiar with the company’s projects, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly. Chevron quickly responded to the impact of American sanctions - such as the loss of American light oil that was used to blend with heavy Venezuelan crude to help it move through pipelines - by switching to Venezuelan light oil. By September, the company was able to restart its Petropiar heavy oil processing plant, which has formed the backbone of Venezuela’s oil export recovery. A senior official with the Trump administration said the activities of Chevron and other foreign oil companies in Venezuela “are clearly of concern.” But the U.S. government has given Chevron exemptions from sanctions, as recently as last month. “If Chevron is forced to leave Venezuela, non-United States companies will fill the void and oil production will continue,” said Ray Fohr, a company spokesman. On the export side, Pdvsa’s biggest ally has been Russia’s Rosneft, which over the past year has grown to sell about two-thirds of Venezuela’s oil. Rosneft has quickly replaced Pdvsa’s American sales routes by diverting its oil to Asia, often obscuring the cargo’s source and destination to bypass sanctions, according to companies that monitor tanker traffic. Barred from the global financial system, Pdvsa has also been forced to cede control to foreign partners in organizing exports, which goes against the country’s energy laws. Over the past few months, Chevron, Rosneft and Italy’s Eni have all directly exported Venezuelan crude. Pdvsa’s opening of exports - oil cargoes worth millions of dollars - to anyone who can bypass sanctions to line up a vessel, insurance and a customer for the crude has even created a small cottage industry among Venezuela’s elite. Now, the only thing that matters is that oil continues to flow, said one partner at a joint oil venture, as he scanned his phone, viewing the state company’s cargo offers. “The historical struggle for resource sovereignty is being sacrificed for operational expediency,” said Antero Alvarado, an energy consultant in Caracas. Venezuela’s new oil production has allowed the country to import essentials like food, medicine and fuel to keep the country running. And there are indications that Mr. Maduro’s government wants to take the underhand liberalization further, even rolling back the watershed nationalization of the oil industry that took place in the 1970s. A group of lawmakers installed at the head of the National Assembly by Mr. Maduro in January - amid an international outcry - has proposed changing energy laws to allow greater private investment. “In these times of declining output, we have to give space to a national proposal that, first of all, shall give private capital greater participation in exploration, production and marketing of oil,” Leandro Domínguez, a lawmaker, said in a statement. Mr. Domínguez’s proposal is not recognized by the United States and most European and Latin American countries, who continue to support a rival, opposition-led congressional leadership. The opposition lawmakers oppose any changes to energy laws under Mr. Maduro, creating a legal limbo for foreign oil companies. Despite the recent changes, there are many reasons to believe Venezuela’s best days as an oil superpower are over, according to Amy Myers Jaffe, an oil expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, and other experts. Venezuela could gradually recover production to 2.6 million barrels a day over 10 years, but only with investments of over $200 billion, according to projections by IPD Latin America, a consulting firm. At a time when many oil companies are struggling with declining profits, executives are looking for cheaper and cleaner sources of oil. Even if a political settlement eventually lifts sanctions, Venezuela’s dirty oil, laden with sulfur and other impurities, may find far fewer investors. Published in LAP website (here). URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/08/world/americas/venezuela-oil-maduro.html

Abstract, Class Strategies in Chavista Venezuela: Pragmatic and Populist Policies in a Broader Context

:::::: Abstract ::::::

Class Strategies in Chavista Venezuela: Pragmatic and Populist Policies in a Broader Context

by Steve Ellner

The governments of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro responded to the opposition’s attempts at regime change by implementing pragmatic policies favoring businesspeople who refused to participate in destabilization actions, as well as populist social measures benefiting the nonprivileged. Both sets of policies have to be placed in political context. The characterization of allegedly pro-government businesspeople as a new ruling elite referred to as the boliburguesía fails to take into account the sharp tensions between them and the Chavista leadership. The primary importance of social programs in the Chavista political triumphs over an extended period of time and of the periodic initiatives that sparked life into individual programs implicitly rules out claims regarding the government’s failure to alleviate poverty or achieve other social objectives. The Chavista governments failed to take full advantage of favorable periods and junctures when the opposition was demoralized following defeats in order to correct the negative side effects of pragmatic and populist class policies, such as bureaucratization and crony capitalism.

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Political Report # 1376 Where Is Socialism in Maduro's Economic Recovery Plan?

By Gerardo Rojas Venezuela Analysis

Recognizing that mistakes have been made in the development of this sector in the past (communes, direct or indirect social property, under worker, campesino or state control) is not an excuse to stop assuming it as a strategic task. If there are major “mistakes” that have been made which have led to the current crisis, these are undoubtedly ones that have to do with the business class that is once again being called upon to enact the new plan, despite its links to corruption and bureaucracy. Furthermore, this demand [of support for social or small-scale production] has constitutional backing, assumed by Chavez as the progressive implementation of article 308 of the Bolivarian Constitution: The state shall protect and promote small and medium-sized manufacturers. I always say that we support and should go on supporting small and medium-sized private manufacturers, but communal manufacturing also fits in here, alongside the private small and medium-sized industries, mixed enterprises, different types and combinations. Going back to the beginning, the state shall protect and promote small and medium-sized manufacturers, cooperatives, savings banks, as well as family-sized companies, micro-enterprises and any other form of community association for work, savings and consumption, under collective property regime (I’m quoting from the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), with the goal of strengthening the economic development of the country, sustained by popular initiative, training, technical assistance and necessary financing will be provided. Collective property includes collective property that is private, mixed, as well as collective social property. Direct social property is an example of this latter form of collective property. (3)

Political Report # 1131 The Left Isn't Dead Yet in Venezuela By Raven Brown, Common Dreams

Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro at a Chavista rally earlier this year. (Photo: Ministry of Communication) Political Report # 1131 The Left Isn't Dead Yet in Venezuela By Raven Brown, Common Dreams

On December 6th Venezuelans headed to the polls and handed a blow to the legacy of Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution. But, contrary to what the majority of media outlets are reporting, while it was damaging to the Revolution, chavismo was not dealt a death blow. The opposition, known as the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), won a two-thirds majority, a landslide victory with 112 parliamentary seats, while the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) only won 55 seats. This puts the opposition in a position to roll back the socialist programs which make up the chavismo policy agenda and to submit President Nicolas Maduro, Chavez's successor, to a referendum aimed to oust him from power.

Political Report #1096 Setting the Record Straight on Venezuela By Steve Ellner, Jacobin

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro next to a portrait of Hugo Chavez in February 2013. Jorge Silva / Reuters By Steve Ellner, Jacobin  Steve Ellner is also an LAP Editor

In many ways, Hugo Chávez's legacy is at stake on December 6. An opposition victory in Venezuela's National Assembly elections would undoubtedly fuel an anti-Chávez narrative that is both simplistic and deceptive, jeopardizing the deceased president's well-earned fame as a champion of the underprivileged.

Political Report # 1078 Venezuela Takes Control of Its Border as Bogotá and Caracas Bring Their Cases to UNASUR By: Frederick B. Mills and William Camacaro, Senior Research Fellows at COHA

la marcha contra el contra el paramilitarismo By: Frederick B. Mills and William Camacaro, Senior Research Fellows at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

On July 13, 2015, President Nicolas Maduro launched an ambitious campaign to fight organized crime (the Operation to Liberate and Protect the People-OLP) in the most seriously impacted states of the country. Over the past week, as a critical phase of this campaign, Venezuela has moved to take control over its notoriously porous border with Colombia in Táchira State, seriously disrupting the routine but illicit trade in contraband goods coming from Venezuela that has fueled a parallel economy in Colombia. This illicit trade, however, as well as manipulative currency exchange practices in the frontier area, has been generating some of the commodity shortages and the depreciation of the bolívar fuerte suffered by consumers in Venezuela. This is not a new issue. The crime and contraband problem along the border had been brewing for more than a decade. Moreover, a growing public outcry calling for decisive action to address both public security concerns and persistent commodity shortages has become particularly intense over the past two years and now threatens to derail the Bolivarian project ahead of the December 2015 legislative elections. Maduro had to either take decisive action or preside over the demise of the revolution.