Abstract, Varieties of Neoliberalism in Brazil

:::::: Abstract ::::::

Varieties of Neoliberalism in Brazil (2003-2019)

by Alfredo Saad-Filho

The main feature of capital accumulation in Brazil during the administrations led by Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party—PT) was the continuity of neoliberalism of two varieties: inclusive (2003–2006) and developmental (2006–2013). The PT’s attachment to neoliberalism was mitigated by the party’s (shifting) commitment to (mild) developmental outcomes, redistribution of income (at the margin), social inclusion (within narrow limits), and democratization of the state (bounded by the 1988 Constitution). Achievements in these areas were further constrained by the inability or unwillingness of the PT to confront the institutionalization of neoliberalism in the fields of economics, politics, ideology, the media, and class relations. The political crisis unfolding in Brazil since 2013 and the imposition of authoritarian neoliberalism after Rousseff’s impeachment can be examined from the perspective of the contradictions in the dominant varieties of neoliberalism under the PT and the limitations of the party’s political ambitions.

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Abstract, Presidents without Roots: Understanding the Peruvian Paradox

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Presidents without Roots: Understanding the Peruvian Paradox

by Carlos Ugo Santander Joo and Carlos Federico Domínguez Avila

Peru’s posttransition democracy presents a paradox: presidents have remained unpopular despite presiding over a period in which democratic institutions strengthened and the economy grew rapidly. O’Donnell’s work on delegative democracy suggests that the Peruvian paradox results from weak vertical accountability. Since Peru’s return to democracy, parties and civil society have been too weak to hold elected leaders accountable. Furthermore, presidents have faced opposition to reform from entrenched neoliberal technocrats. With no one holding them accountable and little capacity to govern, presidents have chosen to delegate decision-making authority to technocrats. Even when leaders have won office on reformist platforms, continuity has prevailed, and citizens have lost trust in their elected leaders. The origins of the Peruvian paradox and weak vertical accountability can be traced to the destruction of the institutional and organizational foundations of democracy in the 1990s under Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian regime.

Abstract, The New Far-Right in Brazil and the Construction of a Right-Wing Order

:::::: Abstract ::::::

The New Far-Right in Brazil and the Construction of a Right-Wing Order

by Ariel Alejandro Goldstein

Michel Temer’s government produced a new right-wing order in Brazil that might be called an “armored democracy.” The main characteristics of this order are the construction of a “leftist” enemy to justify repression of activists and social movements, preserving a loyal base and manipulating the anger if no economic achievements are made; a political partisan role for the judicial powers with strong interference of lobbying and military consultants; a weak democracy without political participation; the establishment of a market-friendly order against the platform voted for by the majority of Brazilians in the 2014 election; right-wing advances in public discourse that have reframed the political culture and discussion; and the accession of a far-right contender to the presidency for the first time since re-democratization began in 1985. Brazil seems to be repeating its history because it has not reflected on and judged its past. The most important threat to democracy is not only this new president but the country’s own elitist, corrupt, and restricted democratic system.

Introduction, Brazil’s Crisis of Memory: Embracing Myths and Forgetting History

:::::: Introduction ::::::

Brazil’s Crisis of Memory: Embracing Myths and Forgetting History

by Paulo Simões

In the late evening of Sunday, September 2, 2018, shortly after closing time, a fire broke out in Brazil’s National Museum. In little more than an hour the blaze had completely engulfed the building, gutting its many galleries and storage areas holding priceless scientific and historical artifacts. Though firefighters valiantly attempted to squelch the conflagration, their job was impeded by the fact that the two closest hydrants were inoperative and water had to be pumped from a nearby lake on the property. All hope was lost when its wooden roof, covered in red terra-cotta tiles, caved in, crushing any objects that might have withstood the heat and leaving only the outer shell of the building standing. Though miraculously there were no injuries reported, because the fire took place after closing hours, the depth of the catastrophe did not fully become visible until the dawn hours of the following day, when the remains of what once had been Latin America’s largest natural history museum and, for more than 60 years, the residence of Emperors Dom Pedro I and Pedro II lay in smoldering ruins. Gone were over 20 million irreplaceable specimens of Brazilian flora and fauna and taxidermic animals (many of them the sole examples of now extinct species) collected over two centuries; Egyptian mummies, Middle Eastern clay tablets, and Greco-Roman artifacts brought over from the Old World by the second monarch; Luzia, the oldest known human skeleton found in the Americas; thousands of books, documents, notebooks, illustrations, paintings, and letters; scientific equipment; and the revered building itself, with its frescoed walls and decorated ceilings, once the symbol of the Brazilian monarchy. Senator Marina Silva, the former environment minister, likened this disaster to a “lobotomy of the Brazilian memory.” The museum’s vice director stated sadly that the destruction of the museum was “an unbearable catastrophe. It is 200 years of this country’s heritage. It is 200 years of memory. It is 200 years of science. It is 200 years of culture, of education” (Horton, 2018)

Abstract, Walking the Tightrope of Socialist Governance: A Strategic-Relational Analysis of Twenty-first-Century Socialism

:::::: Abstract ::::::

Walking the Tightrope of Socialist Governance: A Strategic-Relational Analysis of Twenty-first-Century Socialism
by Marcel Nelson




The process of socialist transformation in a democratic context presents many quandaries including walking a tightrope between pursuing substantive transformation that challenges existing social relations and remaining in power in view of political opposition stemming from such a challenge. The experiences of twenty-first-century socialism in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela provide different examples of ways of balancing the two imperatives. Nicos Poulantzas’s writings on the state shed light on the importance of deepening democracy as part of any process of socialist transformation and on the limits of such a strategy.

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Political Report # 1379 Brazil's history is repeating itself: democracy at stake

By  Norberto Montani Martins Jaime Ernesto Winter Hughes León Institute of Economics (IE), Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) written for LAP

On October 7^th, 2018, Brazilian citizens witnessed the consolidation of the far-right as the leading political force in the country. The former military Jair Bolsonaro almost won in the first round for the presidency. His party – the Social Liberal Party – achieved one of the largest congressional benches in the Chamber of Deputies (51 out of 513 seats) and candidates associated to Bolsonaro excelled in Senate, Gubernatorial and Legislative Assemblies elections all around Brazil.

The country seems to mirror the path that was already trailed by European countries, such as Austria, Germany, Poland and Italy – not to mention Trump’s election in the U.S. The recent Brazilian experience is connected with this broader global movement towards the far-right, an outcome of a structural crisis of capital in its neoliberal phase.

Differently from Europe, xenophobia does not seem to play a relevant role in the Brazilian case – even though Bolsonaro has already referred to recent immigrants in Brazil as the ‘scum of the world’. Indeed, the very possibility of Bolsonaro taking over is an outcome that combines this global element with the authoritarian political culture in Latin America. The current rise of the far-right, which follows the fall of the 2000s’ Pink Tide, reproduces and synthetises the swing of democratic and anti-democratic regimes that historically characterises politics in the region.

The former Brazilian dictatorship started in 1964 and formally ended in 1985. A democratic period was set up when the so-called citizen Constitution was released. It became the mark of a transition from the dictatorship to a democratic period: the ‘new Republic’ (1988-2015). However, the self-amnesty of the militaries (1979) and the continuity of former political forces in power show that this label ‘democracy’ should be relativized.

Political Report # 1378 U.S. Meddling in Venezuela, Venezuela Next

By Vijay Prashad Frontline

On September 8, The New York Times carried a story with a provocative headline: “Trump Administration Discussed Coup Plans With Rebel Venezuelan Officers”. The journalists Ernesto Londoño and Nicholas Casey spoke to 11 current and former United States officials and Venezuelan commanders. These people told the journalists that they had been involved in conversations with the Donald Trump administration about regime change in Venezuela. In August 2017, Trump had bragged that the U.S. had a “military option” for Venezuela. This statement, these men told the reporters, “encouraged rebellious Venezuelan military officers to reach out to Washington”. In February this year, then U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said, “In the history of Venezuela and South American countries, it is often times that the military is the agent of change when things are so bad and the leadership can no longer serve the people.” This was an invitation for a military coup in Venezuela.

Political Report # 1351 On the Eve of National Elections, Mexico's Economy Struggles to Emerge from Decades of "Economic Failure," Report Concludes

by Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)

Washington, DC - Five years after leaders of Mexico's then most prominent political parties agreed on a "Pact for Mexico," Mexico's economy is mired in a "trap of low investment and low growth," and imperiled by liberalization of financial markets that makes it especially vulnerable to the effects of interest rate increases by the US Federal Reserve, as well as global turbulence in financial markets. These are some conclusions of a new research paper from the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) being released just ahead of Mexico's national elections on Sunday, July 1. The report, "The Pact for Mexico After Five Years: How Has it Fared?" concludes: "the country's persistent sluggish growth, poverty, and inequality are rooted in a set of important economic policy choices that have been made consistently for a long time." "It is clear that the Pact for Mexico has failed to produce the economic gains that were promised," CEPR co-director and lead author of the report Mark Weisbrot said. "But it's worse than that: the current government and policymakers are committed to a set of economic policies that have failed for decades and don't look any more likely to succeed going forward." The report looks at overly restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, as well as a lack of public investment, as important contributors to Mexico's long-term economic failure. In the twenty-first century, Mexico's growth in real income per person has placed it 18th of 20 Latin American countries.

Political Report # 1350 Why Is the US Silent About Mexico’s New Internal Security Law?

by Santiago Navarro F. and  Renata Bessi,          Truthout

While Mexican governmental institutions are experiencing a credibility crisis, Mexico’s National Congress approved what is known as the Internal Security Law. According to Article 2 of the text of the law, its objective is “to safeguard the permanence and continuity of governmental order and institutions, as well as national development through the maintenance of constitutional order, the rule of law and democratic governance.” Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto enacted the law, which became effective on December 21, 2017, and has since caused a wave of protests throughout Mexico. Numerous social movements, unions and civil society organizations see the new law as part of a process of militarizing Mexican society, which could worsen violence in the county. In general terms, this law broadens opportunities for the armed forces to act throughout Mexican territory, even legitimizing the use of violence. It allows the armed forces to intervene in matters that concern civil authorities, such as disturbances and protests that are considered violent or acts of resistance. The law also permits the invasion of citizens’ privacy to collect intelligence information and entry into homes without a court order, including during criminal legal system investigations. Anneliese Danaé Echeverria, an attorney and professor who is a union member and legal affairs assistant with Section 22 of the National Organization of Education Workers (CNTE) in the state of Oaxaca, tells Truthout, “The Mexican Constitution established that the army could not intervene in civil matters, they had to resolve any conflicts through the military court system. Civilians have their own courts. But the new law guarantees military intervention in all aspects of civilian life throughout the country. Civil authorities that are already in crisis will have little room to interfere with these interventions, because the military will act immediately, without consultation or requesting a warrant.”

Abstract, New Media and the Disillusion of Brazil’s Radical Left

:::::: Abstract ::::::

New Media and the Disillusion of Brazil’s Radical Left
by Catherine Morgans

In contrast to recent waves of ad hoc social-media-fueled protest, Brazil’s leftist social movements consider new media unreliable, supplementary, and dominated by hegemonic actors. Owing to a shift in power relations online, these virtual spaces pose an approximation to their capitalist adversaries, a degree of institutionalization, and a breach of traditional trenches of resistance, leading anticapitalist movements to restrict their use of new media. Their wariness counters resurgent cyberoptimism that regards the Internet as a politically neutral or autonomous space favored by marginalized and alternative political actors.

Introduction, Media, Politics, and Democratization in Latin America

:::::: Introduction ::::::

Media, Politics, and Democratization in Latin America
by  Javier Campo, Tomás Crowder-Taraborrelli


This issue has a predecessor from decades ago: Culture in the Age of Mass Media (Burton and Franco, 1978). Forty years may have gone by, but some problems and major concepts remain: resistance, ideological manipulation (though today we use the term “hegemonic cultural influence”), mass communication, and new media technologies. Latin America was then ruled by some of history’s bloodiest military dictatorships, while today the return of right-wing governments after a decade of popular governments is disconcerting. The hopeful ending of Burton and Franco’s introduction (“This repression has been unable to destroy the people’s culture, which continues to find avenues to express resistance” [1978: 10]) has led to a fruitful harvest in recent years, quickly provoking a backlash (often violent). Today we are witnessing a substantial investment in the militarization of police forces and electronic surveillance systems—in particular, the social networks used by young cyber-activists who have grown up with the Internet and, as Linda Herrera (2014: 2–3) points out regarding the riots in Egypt (the “Twitter revolution”), are accustomed to defending their political agendas online.

NEW LAP Issue! Media, Politics, and Democratization in Latin America

Edited by: Javier Campo and Tomás Crowder-Taraborrelli

Issue 220 | Volume 45 | Number 3 | May 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

This special issue of Latin American Perspectives investigates a matter that has undergone critical transformations in recent years. From the period of progressive governments to the current neoliberal restoration, the media went from being thought of as a public service to a private business. This issue features articles on Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Argentina and covers a broad disciplinary spectrum of studies: from the laws of communication put into practice or projected, to the deregulation of the most advanced legislations of Latin America, to communication rights, audiovisual analysis, memory studies and historiographies of the Latin American left.

The editors were committed to organizing a special issue about the favorable democratization of the media, but in the process, the media landscape was transformed into a reactionary onslaught of the monopolies of information and communication; a process that ended in the electoral victories of right-wing corporatists.

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Political Report # 1329 Lula Falls, and Brazilian Democracy Looks Shakier

By Jon Lee Anderson The New Yorker

We live in a world where it is no longer shocking to learn that major heads of state-Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Rodrigo Duterte, Benjamin Netanyahu-are under suspicion for having misused the power of their office, although none of these has yet been formally charged with any wrongdoing. In Latin America, on the other hand, a slew of sitting and former Presidents have been swept up in corruption scandals, a number have been investigated and indicted, and several have gone to jail. Last month, in Peru, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski resigned rather than face impeachment over corruption allegations, and his predecessor, Ollanta Humala, is in jail awaiting trial for alleged corruption. Ricardo Martinelli, the former President of Panama, has been in jail in Miami since June, pending extradition on corruption charges. El Salvador’s former President Antonio Saca is in prison on charges of embezzling public funds, while his predecessor, Francisco Flores, died, of a cerebral hemorrhage, while under house arrest pending his trial. (Flores was accused of having diverted, to his own pocket, several million dollars in foreign aid intended for earthquake victims.) In neighboring Guatemala, two former Presidents, Álvaro Colom and Otto Pérez Molina, are also facing trial, also for corruption. Others, accused of a variety of crimes, mostly bribery or embezzlement of public funds, are fighting in the courts, while a couple-Alejandro Toledo, of Peru, and Mauricio Funes, of El Salvador-have become fugitives, living in the United States and Nicaragua, respectively.

Political Report # 1301 Ousted Honduran President Zelaya Says 2009 US-Backed Coup Led to Election Crisis

by Amy Goodman DemocracyNow!

In an exclusive interview, former Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, who was ousted in a 2009 US-backed coup, says US actions led to the current political crisis in Honduras. The government continues to withhold the results of the November presidential election, which pitted US-backed President Juan Orlando Hernández against opposition candidate Salvador Nasralla. Massive protests erupted after the government-controlled electoral commission stopped tallying votes when the count showed Nasralla ahead. Zelaya now heads the opposition LIBRE party, which is part of the Alliance Against the Dictatorship coalition led by Nasralla. TRANSCRIPT AMY GOODMAN: In Honduras, the political crisis continues as the government is still refusing to release the results of the November 26 presidential election, held almost two weeks ago. The election pits US-backed President Juan Orlando Hernández against opposition candidate Salvador Nasralla, head of the National Alliance Against the Dictatorship. Massive protests erupted over the weekend, after the government-controlled electoral commission stopped tallying votes when the count showed Nasralla ahead of Hernández by more than 5 percentage points. After the delay, the electoral commission then claimed Hernández was ahead, sparking protests in which as many as 11 people were killed and more than 1,200 detained. Earlier this week, the Honduran police mutinied against the government, saying they would no longer enforce a curfew and crackdown against protesters. Well, on Wednesday, in a Democracy Now! exclusive, I spoke with President Manuel Zelaya. He was president of Honduras from 2006 to 2009, before he was ousted in a US-backed coup on June 28th, 2009. He's now head of the opposition LIBRE party, part of the coalition of the Alliance Against the Dictatorship, which is led by the opposition presidential candidate Salvador Nasralla. We spoke via Democracy Now!video stream. President Zelaya was in Tegucigalpa. I began by asking him to describe the situation in Honduras right now. MANUEL ZELAYA: [translated] Look, people are in the streets. There are a million people in the streets. There are takeovers. There are checkpoints. There are demonstrations. People are also being killed, assassinated by the repressive apparatuses of the state. There is a massive protest of society because of the lack of transparency in the electoral system. Today, we are calling our candidate, who is now president-elect -- we are calling for a count of all polling places. There are only 18,000 polling places. It's not such a large number. That can be done in a matter of four days. So that the people can regain calm, because based on the data that the state itself put out, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Alliance of Opposition Against the Dictatorship, on the day of the election, the tribunal said that we had a 5 percent lead, with 71 percent of the votes counted. They said, with 57 percent counted, the alliance already had a 5 percent advantage, and then, with 71 percent counted, the 5 percent trend was maintained -- 71 percent. It was a 5 percent lead and growing.

Abstract, Low-Intensity Democracy and Peru’s Neoliberal State: The Case of the Humala Administration

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Low-Intensity Democracy and Peru’s Neoliberal State: The Case of the Humala Administration
by William Aviles and Yolima Rey Rosas   

The election of Ollanta Humala in 2011 did not lead to a radical break from neoliberalism as many expected. His administration continued and deepened Peru’s conservative political and economic regime, its “low-intensity democracy.” His lack of a shift has been attributed to electoral dynamics, his leadership style, and the weakness of political parties. However, these readings overlook the structural impediments to any left government in Peru and Humala’s readiness to adapt his politics to this neoliberal reality. The power of Peru’s neoliberal political elite, the United States, economic groups, and transnational capital have all helped to constitute a structure of elite rule strong enough to prevent a radical shift.

Abstract, Economic Extractivism and Agrarian Social Movements: Perspectives on Low-Intensity Democracy in the Face of the Colombian Conflict

:::::: Abstract ::::::

Economic Extractivism and Agrarian Social Movements: Perspectives on Low-Intensity Democracy in the Face of the Colombian Conflict
by Leila Celis

During the mid-1980s, Colombia joined the neoliberal global economy in two ways: (1) by implementing a “low-intensity democracy” made up of reforms intended to institutionalize the social protests as a response to the crisis of governance and to promote investor security and (2) by exchanging a protectionist industrialization economic model for an extractivist neoliberal one. The new progressive legislation created inclusive institutions and recognized multiculturalism and social and political rights, but these very rights are denied by the neoliberal economy, which favors big transnational capital and the physical and legal coercion that this model requires. These two pivotal elements of neoliberalism (governance and the economy) are pragmatically incompatible. The dominant class has favored the interests of powerful transnational elites and employed both legal and military avenues. Consequently, 30 years later, the social movements have been only partially and temporarily institutionalized. Active rejection of the economic model is growing. Social organizations have appropriated the concept of human rights and adapted it to their social project, the construction of a peasant economy that opposes the neoliberal one.

Introduction, Democracy, Repression, and the Defense of Human Rights

:::::: Intro ::::::

Democracy, Repression, and the Defense of Human Rights
by William Avilés and Leila Celis                                    


In the 1990s Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson (1993) directly challenged the democratic-transitions literature through critical assessments of the relatively young democracies in Latin America and the developing world. They introduced the model of “low-intensity democracy” as a more precise classification of the limits of democratic change in the developing world after the cold war. A low-intensity democracy is a largely procedural democracy that allows political opposition, greater individual freedoms, a reduced institutional role for the armed forces, and a more permeable environment for the investments of transnational capital. Greatly expanding on this idea, William Robinson (1996) posited that, given the instability that authoritarian regimes of the past had engendered in the populace, these elite democracies were essential to the global integration of these economies. Democratization movements seeking radical change beyond formal electoral competition were pushed aside by the more conservative leaders of antiauthoritarian movements. These leaders were financed and advised by U.S. foreign policy makers, who presented them as paragons of democracy in an emerging global capitalist age. They represented economic and political factions pursuing the integration of their respective economies into capitalist globalization and fully prepared to turn to state and para-state repression of groups that challenged the state outside of the formal democratic institutions.

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Democracy, Repression, and the Defense of Human Rights 

by William Avilés and Leila Celis

Tomas Ocampo, Outreach Coordinator for Latin American Perspectives, interviews issue editors William Avilés and Leila Celis on: Democracy, Repression, and the Defense of Human Rights published in September 2017.

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Our Latest Issue! Democracy, Repression, and the Defense of Human Rights

Democracy, Repression, and the Defense of Human Rights 

edited by William Avilés and Leila Celis

Issue 216 | Volume 44 |  Issue 5 | September 2017

Table of Contents

In the 1990s Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson directly challenged the democratic-transitions literature by introducing the model of “low-intensity democracy” a largely procedural democracy that allows political opposition, greater individual freedoms, a reduced institutional role for the armed forces, and a more permeable environment for the investments of transnational capital. Increasingly since the 1970s, low-intensity democracies have been viewed as the political regime best equipped to integrate Latin America into capitalist globalization. This issue is largely dedicated to an examination of these restricted democracies across the region. In contrast to the expectations of much of mainstream democratization scholarship, this issue demonstrates how “democracies” in Latin America have not become more consolidated along some linear continuum.  In fact, they have maintained political and socioeconomic exclusion, military/judicial/paramilitary repression, often through extralegal practices, including the criminalization of protest, massacres, and the forced displacement of whole communities.

Political Report # 1267 The Venezuelan Dilemma: Progressives and the "Plague on Both Your Houses" Position

By Steve Ellner (LAP Editor), Venezuela Analysis

In recent weeks, a number of Venezuelan specialists on the left side of the political spectrum have published and posted pieces that place them in an anti-Chavista, “ni-ni” position that consists of “a plague on both your houses” with regard to Maduro and the Venezuelan opposition. Certainly, at this moment the Chavistas are playing hard ball; the options available to them are limited. I consider myself a “critical Chavista.” It’s not an easy position to be in, particularly because the last thing I would want to do is to act in any way that would favor the right (that is the Venezuelan opposition and its allies abroad). On the other hand, I have always opposed (even in my writing) the position of some people on the left who feel that U.S. leftists should not publicly express criticisms of socialist governments. Criticism (including public criticism) is necessary as it is part of the process of assimilating lessons. The recent articles that harshly attack the Maduro government have been published in Jacobin magazine by Gabriel Hetland and another by Mike Gonzalez as well as Hetland’s piece posted by NACLA: Report on the Americas in which he uses the expression “que se vayan todos.” More recently NACLA posted an interview with Alejandro Velasco that was originally published in the magazine Nueva Sociedad.